Paying for POPs: Negotiating the Implementation of the Stockholm Convention in Developing Countries

Abstract

A key aspect of the negotiations for the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) related to provisions surrounding its financial mechanism to facilitate its implementation in developing countries. This article examines how financial aspects of the Convention were negotiated as the treaty was taking shape and how financial provisions have been implemented since the Convention's entry into force in 2004. Regarding the design of the financial mechanism, developing countries stressed the need for new and additional financial resources and a tailored institution, while developed countries favored working with existing financial institutions, notably the Global Environment Facility (GEF). In the end, countries compromised by agreeing that GEF would serve as the Convention's "interim" financial mechanism while also recognizing that financial and technical support is directly related to developing countries' ability to comply with the treaty's obligations. We discuss the implications of this outcome and then provide an overview of how this arrangement has played out in practice. We conclude by discussing the implications of recent developments, notably the expansion of the scope of the Convention from 12 to 21 chemicals in May 2009 and the finalization of the fifth replenishment of the GEF in May 2010.

Dioxin and Furan Emissions and Its Management Practices

“…The issue of POPs begun to be addressed in the 1980s; Canada has brought it onto the international agenda [10][11][12]. In Canada, research found out and heightened the sensitivity of concerns of its northern indigenous populations.…”

Establishing global climate resilience to persistent organic pollutants through the private sector: a call to reform institutional standards of the International Finance Corporation

“…This is especially problematic for poorer nations that rely primarily on GEF funding that, amongst multiple projects, do not prioritize POP reduction. Additionally, the GEF does not have the capacity to assess whether funds allocated for POP removal are appropriately or effectively used (Ashton and Kohler 2010).…”