Patterns of cooperation during collective emergencies in the help-or-escape social dilemma

Moussaïd, Mehdi; Trauernicht, Mareike

doi:10.1038/srep33417

Cited by 27 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…This study extends this research and finds that this effect is increased when in the presence of another psychological group in counterflow, leading participants to decrease their speed and distance in order to maintain closer proximity with ingroup members. This is contrary to the research of Helbing et al [20] and Moussaïd et al [5] which suggests that groups split up to improve crowd flow; in our experiment participants with a shared identity prioritised staying together over moving quickly. One reason for this could be that Helbing et al and Moussaïd et al were generalising crowd behaviour from the physical crowds used in their research.…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 99%

“…For example, the participants did not form the multiple single lanes found by Helbing et al [32] instead electing to create two large lanes to stay together. Moreover, in contrast to Moussaïd et al [5], they did not choose the direction of movement which would least decrease their speed, instead prioritising staying with ingroup members and thus moving more slowly. These findings suggest that when considering pedestrian counterflow, research should consider that groups with a shared social identity prioritise staying together even when it impedes their speed.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 81%

“…One approach suggests that pedestrians act as they would as individuals according to their personality (e.g. [5]). Other research proposes that pedestrians are guided by visual cues in the environment, such as the distance of pedestrians to obstacles and others [6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Placing Large Group Relations into Pedestrian Dynamics: Psychological Crowds in Counterflow

2020

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Understanding influences on pedestrian movement is important to accurately simulate crowd behaviour, yet little research has explored the psychological factors that influence interactions between large groups in counterflow scenarios. Research from social psychology has demonstrated that social identities can influence the micro-level pedestrian movement of a psychological crowd, yet this has not been extended to explore behaviour when two large psychological groups are co-present. This study investigates how the presence of large groups with different social identities can affect pedestrian behaviour when walking in counterflow. Participants (N = 54) were divided into two groups and primed to have identities as either ‘team A’ or ‘team B’. The trajectories of all participants were tracked to compare the movement of team A when walking alone to when walking in counterflow with team B, based on their i) speed of movement and distance walked, and ii) proximity between participants. In comparison to walking alone, the presence of another group influenced team A to collectively self-organise to reduce their speed and distance walked in order to walk closely together with ingroup members. We discuss the importance of incorporating social identities into pedestrian group dynamics for empirically validated simulations of counterflow scenarios.

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Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 81%

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Placing Large Group Relations into Pedestrian Dynamics: Psychological Crowds in Counterflow

2020

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“…Nonetheless, being another mechanism to avoid risk, it is possible to have heterogeneous, somewhat assortative mobility [65], with loners having a different probability, m L , than the other agents. In one extreme case, loners may avoid risk by drifting away from their non-loners, immobile neighbors (m = 0, m L = 0), what can be interpreted as fleeing from risky situations without helping others [66] or, alternatively, as a punishment for not complying with the social norm and, consequently, being expelled. In the other extreme, m = 0 and m L = 0, loners do not care much about their neighborhood and stay put while the other strategies may move.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk and Interaction Aversion: Screening Mechanisms in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Canova

Arenzon

2017

J Stat Phys

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When the interactions between cooperators (C) and defectors (D) can be partially avoided within a population, there may be an overall enhancement of cooperation. One example of such screening mechanism occurs in the presence of risk-averse agents (loners, L) that are neutral towards others, i.e., both L and its opponent, whatever its strategy, receive the same payoff. Their presence in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game sustains the coexistence of cooperators and defectors far beyond the level attained in their absence. Another screening mechanism is a heterogeneous landscape obtained, for example, by site diluting the lattice. In this case, cooperation is enhanced with some fraction of such inactive, interaction-averse sites. By considering the interplay of both mechanisms, we show that there is an explosive increase in the range of densities, just above the percolation threshold, where neutrality is prevented and loners become extinct, the behavior reverting to the pure PD game. Interestingly, this occurs despite defectors being usually abundant in that region. This has to be compared with the corresponding loner-free region in the undiluted case that, besides being very small, is dominated by cooperators.

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“…For instance, interesting works on game-theoretic applications have been developed to study decisions taken by evacuees, e.g. exit selection [35], pedestrian movement and route choice [17,[36][37][38][39], or helping behaviors [40]. Similarly, single authority decisions in case of evacuation have been investigated using game theory, e.g., security prevention [41], or risk perception [42].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The cry wolf effect in evacuation: A game-theoretic approach

Rigos

Mohlin

Ronchi

2019

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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In today's terrorism-prone and security-focused world, evacuation emergencies, drills, and false alarms are becoming more and more common. Compliance to an evacuation order made by an authority in case of emergency can play a key role in the outcome of an emergency. In case an evacuee experiences repeated emergency scenarios which may be a false alarm (e.g., an evacuation drill, a false bomb threat, etc.) or an actual threat, the Aesop's cry wolf effect (repeated false alarms decrease order compliance) can severely affect his/her likelihood to evacuate. To analyse this key unsolved issue of evacuation research, a game-theoretic approach is proposed. Game theory is used to explore mutual best responses of an evacuee and an authority. In the proposed model the authority obtains a signal of whether there is a threat or not and decides whether to order an evacuation or not. The evacuee, after receiving an evacuation order, subsequently decides whether to stay or leave based on posterior beliefs that have been updated in response to the authority's action. Best-responses are derived and Sequential equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium are used as solution concepts (refining equilibria with the intuitive criterion). Model results highlight the benefits of announced evacuation drills and suggest that improving the accuracy of threat detection can prevent large inefficiencies associated with the cry wolf effect. dynamics during evacuation [2][3][4], which aims at representing human movement and associated behaviour in case of different scenarios and threats [6,7], or models of authority's recommendations [8].Human behaviour in evacuation scenarios has also been investigated using Virtual Reality tools, as they allow the investigation of individual and group decision making during evacuation [9][10][11][12]. Experimental work has been performed in order to validate such models and tools, including the study of different types of emergent behaviours related to evacuation dynamics [13][14][15][16][17].The main limitations of these tools is that they consider evacuation scenarios in isolation and they address only one of the two parties involved in an evacuation, either (i) the decision making of the authority (i.e. their orders/instructions) or (ii) the actions of the evacuees. In contrast, currently there is no framework available which is able to comprehensively consider optimal decision making strategies for an authority and an evacuee at the same time in case of several repeated emergency evacuation threats. Many tragedies have demonstrated the dilemmas that decision makers may face when dealing with emergency situations. For instance, in relation to the Costa Concordia disaster, the Italian court trial is evaluating the behaviour of captain Schettino who allegedly did not order the evacuation of the ship on time [18]. Apart from the Captain's negligence or a simply incorrect assessment of the situation, the analysis of the trade-offs between the cost of a useless evacuation (i.e., the risk of "ruining" the holid...

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Patterns of cooperation during collective emergencies in the help-or-escape social dilemma

Cited by 27 publications

References 37 publications

Placing Large Group Relations into Pedestrian Dynamics: Psychological Crowds in Counterflow

Placing Large Group Relations into Pedestrian Dynamics: Psychological Crowds in Counterflow

Risk and Interaction Aversion: Screening Mechanisms in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

The cry wolf effect in evacuation: A game-theoretic approach

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