Patriotism, Orthodox religion and education: empirical findings from contemporary Russia

Koellner, Tobias

doi:10.1080/09637494.2016.1246852

Cited by 27 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Using metrics of belief and institutional participation, as is common to measure religiosity in predominantly Christian societies, many scholars have concluded that Eastern Slavs are “nominally Orthodox.” Others have found inspiration in Grace Davie's succinct depiction of the English as “believing without belonging.” Jeanne Kormina (2010: 280) suggests that “belonging without believing” is more appropriate for Russians because they are part of a “church of the unchurched” (Kormina and Luehrmann 2017). Tobias Köllner (2012) characterizes Russians as “practicing without belonging,” whereas Julie McBrien (2017) finds that “belonging” in Kyrgyzstan can morph into “believing.” “Minimal religion” is Mikhail Epstein's term to depict the Russian blending of mysticism, theosophy, “faith pure and simple,” and estrangement from religious institutions (1999: 378). These tensions between practice and belief and defining what one belongs to are reflected in the fact that, while conducting research in Ukraine, I rarely use the word “religion” and seldom end up at church.…”

Section: Anticlericalism and Institutional Disaffectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Affective Atmosphere of Religiosity: Animated Places, Public Spaces, and the Politics of Attachment in Ukraine and Beyond

Wanner

2020

Comp Stud Soc Hist

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When religious institutions engage the secular emotively and publicly, they can foster an affective atmosphere of religiosity, which potentially has motivational power, even for non-believers, because it shapes the sensorium of those who circulate in public space. When individuals appeal to “places animated with prayer” for the transformative energy that resides there through ritualized practices, they reaffirm an affective atmosphere of religiosity. In Orthodox Eastern Europe and elsewhere, a confessional tradition is allied with state borders, further normativizing this affective atmosphere and giving it pronounced political implications. When an affective atmosphere of religiosity inspires practices that are intentionally designed to prompt experiences rendered meaningful in otherworldly terms, over time such performativity can create mimetic instincts that become second nature. This is an essential step to religion becoming an expedient political resource and to the emergence of religious nationalism or a confessional state.

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Section: Anticlericalism and Institutional Disaffectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Affective Atmosphere of Religiosity: Animated Places, Public Spaces, and the Politics of Attachment in Ukraine and Beyond

Wanner

2020

Comp Stud Soc Hist

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“…The ideology of teaching religion in the post-Soviet Russian public schools have been already examined by a number of researchers (Mitrokhin, 2000(Mitrokhin, , 2004(Mitrokhin, , 2005Glanzer, 2005;Halstead, 1994;Willems, 2007;Lisovskaya and Karpov, 2010;Shnirelman, 2011Shnirelman, , 2012Shnirelman, , 2017Köllner, 2016;Lisovskaya, 2016;Lisovskaya, 2017). It was shown that the introduction of religion-related courses is considered a visible embodiment of church-state relations, when the attempt to implement a model of church-state separation ultimately failed and "the regime increasingly drew upon the country's traditional religion not only as a source of legitimacy, but also for political support" (Marsh 2013: 20).…”

Section: Objectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

"Spiritual and Moral Education" in Russian Public Schools: Constructing a Neo-traditionalist Identity

Ожиганова¹

2019

FIRE

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The article examines the problems of teaching religion in post-Soviet Russia public schools which has become an important part of the national educational politics since the 2000s. Teaching religion is implemented in a number of compulsory and optional school subjects united under the name of spiritual and moral education and based on the so called national traditional values, such as patriotism, traditional religions, family and so on. I analyze spiritual and moral education as conducive to creating a very specific state ideology, which can be characterized as neotraditionalist, the main components of which are great-power ambitions, ethno-nationalism and Russian Orthodoxy. I draw special attention to the problem of patriarchy, family, and gender roles as important components of the ideology of neotraditionalism. The objective of the article is to show how the ideological principles of neotraditionalism are embodied in methodological materials and textbooks used in the religion-related courses and what types of identities-civic, religious, and gender-they construct.

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“…This law, overturning a 1992 law that outlawed the practice, paved the way for an Orthodoxy module introduced in 2012. Even though this module is meant to be nonevangelizing, critics argue that the Church successfully uses this course not only to strengthen its own position in Russian society, but to propagate its ideal of a Russian national identity (which, perhaps not surprisingly, coincides well with that advocated by the Kremlin) (Köllner, 2016). 3.…”

Section: Authoritarianism and Traditionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Russian Orthodox Church, the Kremlin, and religious (il)liberalism in Russia

Lamoreaux

Flake

2018

Palgrave Commun

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The apparent 'symphonia' of church-state cooperation in Russia is a matter of debate and concern in the West. By some accounts the war in Ukraine kicked that collusion into another gear entirely, with the Russian Orthodox Church now a fully assimilated part of the Kremlin's domestic and foreign policy machine. We argue that, though such claims may prove hyperbolic, the rise in political authoritarianism in Russia and its neighbourhood is being matched by significant restrictions in Russia's religious playfield, and that both the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church benefit from the policies and practices of the other. Consequently, now is not a good time to be a member of a non-traditional church or of a so-called foreign sect in Russia. More disconcerting, a continuation of these trends may portend further crackdowns not just on religious freedoms, but across the spectrum of civil liberties in Russia.

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Patriotism, Orthodox religion and education: empirical findings from contemporary Russia

Cited by 27 publications

References 15 publications

An Affective Atmosphere of Religiosity: Animated Places, Public Spaces, and the Politics of Attachment in Ukraine and Beyond

An Affective Atmosphere of Religiosity: Animated Places, Public Spaces, and the Politics of Attachment in Ukraine and Beyond

"Spiritual and Moral Education" in Russian Public Schools: Constructing a Neo-traditionalist Identity

The Russian Orthodox Church, the Kremlin, and religious (il)liberalism in Russia

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