2021
DOI: 10.1080/1060586x.2021.1905417
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Patriotic disunity: limits to popular support for militaristic policy in Russia

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Cited by 15 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 31 publications
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“…In addition to the spatial (cross-country) dimension, our discussion involves drawing comparisons across time. Unlike much of the literature on post-Soviet Russian patriotism, which can effectively be categorized as foregrounding either the 1990s (Oushakine, 2009) or the Putin years (Sperling, 2009;Laruelle, 2009;Goode, 2018;Baekken, 2021), our analysis bridges the two eras. Drawing on survey questions asked consistently across three decades, beginning in the mid-1990s, we highlight a patriotism that has been surprisingly stable and largely impervious to the changes over this period in Russia's internal and external environments.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition to the spatial (cross-country) dimension, our discussion involves drawing comparisons across time. Unlike much of the literature on post-Soviet Russian patriotism, which can effectively be categorized as foregrounding either the 1990s (Oushakine, 2009) or the Putin years (Sperling, 2009;Laruelle, 2009;Goode, 2018;Baekken, 2021), our analysis bridges the two eras. Drawing on survey questions asked consistently across three decades, beginning in the mid-1990s, we highlight a patriotism that has been surprisingly stable and largely impervious to the changes over this period in Russia's internal and external environments.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Much of the writing on post-Soviet Russian patriotism draws on similar distinctions, and unlike the ICG, downplays the hold over the population of the more malign variety. Baekken (2021), for instance, explores the success of state-led efforts to inculcate a "military patriotism" in Russian society, concluding that while it appeals to some, the public, on balance, "seems to be at odds with the state's conception of patriotism as 'blind ' and state-oriented ... [and instead prefers] patriotic sentiment 'untainted' by political life and less dependent on military tropes." Goode (2016) develops a similar point, contrasting Russians' "love for the Motherland," which is genuine and private, with "being patriotic," which is inauthentic and performative in its support of regime initiatives, including foreign aggression.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition to the spatial (cross-country) dimension, our discussion involves drawing comparisons across time. Unlike much of the literature on post-Soviet Russian patriotism, which can effectively be categorized as foregrounding either the 1990s (Oushakine, 2009) or the Putin years (Sperling, 2009;Laruelle, 2009;Goode, 2018;Baekken, 2021), our analysis bridges the two eras. Drawing on survey questions asked consistently across three decades, beginning in the mid-1990s, we highlight a patriotism that has been surprisingly stable and largely impervious to the changes over this period in Russia's internal and external environments.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Типичное мнение: среди российской элиты патриотическая легитимация регулирует конкуренцию, определяет границы приемлемой публичной политики и обеспечивает доступ к покровительству режима (Goode 2021). Российской власти приписывается склонность к «милитаризации патриотизма» (Baekken 2021).…”
Section: трактовки концепта патриотизма в теоретическом дискурсеunclassified