2015
DOI: 10.1111/jep.12430
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Patients' ‘thingification’, unexplained symptoms and response‐ability in the clinical context: in response to ‘Patients' substantialization of disease, the hybrid symptom and the metaphysical care’, by Alexandra Parvan

Abstract: The types of diseases, or categories of suffering, referred to as medically unexplained symptoms or syndromes (MUS) are the focus for the following commentary. Such cases seem to invite reflection. The very nature of such complex patterns of disease and suffering raises a number of fundamental epistemological and ontological issues. Furthermore, such health challenges can serve as the basis for an exploration of how the suffering person as well as the medical caretaker comes to grip with disease, incapacitatio… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 15 publications
(15 reference statements)
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“…Noting how easy it is for us to become depersonalized when we become patients, Mitchell argues (in line with contributors to previous editions of this journal) that we can be compliant in this depersonalization because “in the early stages, particularly of serious illness, we do not wish to face the fact that our body is failing.” Rather than face this, “we separate ourselves from our illness”: we do not take ourselves to the doctor for treatment, but rather we take our illness. Mitchell presents a compelling account of the “fragmentation” of the person that ensues, how health professionals and systems can push us in the direction of this depersonalization and also how we can regain the status of personhood while remaining users of the health care system.…”
Section: Person‐centred Care and The Phenomenology Of Illnessmentioning
confidence: 85%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Noting how easy it is for us to become depersonalized when we become patients, Mitchell argues (in line with contributors to previous editions of this journal) that we can be compliant in this depersonalization because “in the early stages, particularly of serious illness, we do not wish to face the fact that our body is failing.” Rather than face this, “we separate ourselves from our illness”: we do not take ourselves to the doctor for treatment, but rather we take our illness. Mitchell presents a compelling account of the “fragmentation” of the person that ensues, how health professionals and systems can push us in the direction of this depersonalization and also how we can regain the status of personhood while remaining users of the health care system.…”
Section: Person‐centred Care and The Phenomenology Of Illnessmentioning
confidence: 85%
“…Heidegger's account of the experience of anxiety and the way that separates us from "the world of involvements" is a crucial starting point for the paper which follows, focusing on the journey "from person to patient and back again." 50 Noting how easy it is for us to become depersonalized when we become patients, Mitchell argues (in line with contributors to previous editions of this journal 86,87 ) that we can be compliant in this depersonalization because "in the early stages, particularly of serious illness, we do not wish to face the fact that our body is failing." Rather than face this, "we separate ourselves from our illness": we do not take ourselves to the doctor for treatment, but rather we take our illness.…”
Section: Person-centred Care and The Phenomenology Of Illnessmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Crucial information is lost along the way. The transformation of a particular person into 1 or several defined disease entities in the same body provokes the alienation of this particular person from her or his lifeworld, imposing a “thingification” to serve such medical purposes as taxonomy and classification . What is lost in translation may be nothing less than the most salient source of knowledge as to the origin or source of the particular person's current health problem(s), namely the lived experiences that both ignite and maintain inflammation and other disturbances on the physiological level which provoke bad health and lead to premature death.…”
Section: A Problematic Nexusmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This year's debates section contains two responses to previously published articles in this journal. Responding to Parvan's paper in the previous philosophy thematic [32] on patients' 'substantialization of disease' and metaphysical care, Eriksen and Kirkengen [51] begin by providing their own reflection on the epistemological and ontological questions raised by the phenomenon of medically unexplained symptoms or syndromes. They argue that 'such health challenges can serve as the basis for an exploration of how the suffering person as well as the medical caretaker come to grips with disease, incapacitation or suffering'.…”
Section: Debatesmentioning
confidence: 99%