Paternalism and democracy

The New Paternalism

“…This last statement by Dworkin points to the source of criticisms of the conventional account of paternalism raised by feminist and other theorists. Insofar as Dworkin suggests it is possible for paternalism to be autonomy fostering—or at least autonomy preserving—what is noteworthy is that such a configuration of relations is still termed “paternalism.” The Dworkin view, Marion Smiley (2004, 308) writes, leads us to view “all forms of government protection as paternalistic.” She explains, the accepted definitions “ignore the context of paternalistic choice-making—or in other words, the relationships of domination and inequality that exist between a paternalist and those subject to paternalistic treatment” (p. 308). The problem with paternalism, then, is not only or entirely its infringement on individual free choice but the fact that it “perpetuates (or at least expresses) relationships of domination and inequality among individual members of a community” (p. 309).…”

“…A power differential between state and citizens or state agents and citizens in itself does not signal paternalism; it is specifically when such power is used in a coercive fashion that serves oppressive ends that paternalism can be seen. This is central to the distinction Smiley makes between paternalism and nonpaternalistic “protection.” Smiley (2004, 314) emphasizes how protective legislation can challenge systems of domination and inequality, whereas paternalistic legislation perpetuates them. She notes, “Protective legislation enables individuals to organize themselves collectively against powerful actors who, because of their institutional positions of strength, are able to lead other individuals to take serious physical risks.” Protective legislation gives marginalized and weak citizens the collective power that they may inherently lack given their societal positioning.…”