Patents in a world of complex technologies

Kash, Don E.; Kingston, William

doi:10.3152/147154301781781660

Cited by 51 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…This study uses patent applications rather than granted patents, partly because the former are published earlier and partly because they better reflect the technological competitiveness of an invention (whereas the latter reflect the economic competitiveness and market strength of the inventor as well as the market attractiveness of the invention). It can be assumed that patent applications are preceded by often quite large investments in the research and development process (Grupp, 1998, 145-147;Kash & Kingston, 2001). Therefore, patents can be regarded as an output indicator (or a success indicator) of research and development (R&D) processes (Freeman, 1982, p. 8).…”

Section: Methodological Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender-specific patterns in patenting and publishing

Haller²,

et al. 2009

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Section: Methodological Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender-specific patterns in patenting and publishing

Haller²,

et al. 2009

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“…A communications equipment manufacturer's executive stated, "If you don't think you can get the patent, but you are afraid someone else might get it, you publicly publish it, so that our idea doesn't get turned around on us." Nonaka and Nagata [1998] and Kash and Kingston [2000] between "complex" versus "discrete" or simple technologies. For our purpose, the key difference between a complex and a discrete technology is whether a new, commercializable product or process is comprised of numerous separately patentable elements versus relatively few.…”

Section: Why Patent?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)

Cohen¹,

Nelson²,

Walsh³

2000

2,144

2,035

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Based on a survey questionnaire administered to 1478 R&D labs in the U.S. manufacturing sector in 1994, we find that firms typically protect the profits due to invention with a range of mechanisms, including patents, secrecy, lead time advantages and the use of complementary marketing and manufacturing capabilities. Of these mechanisms, however, patents tend to be the least emphasized by firms in the majority of manufacturing industries, and secrecy and lead time tend to be emphasized most heavily. A comparison of our results with the earlier survey findings of Levin et al. [1987] suggest that patents may be relied upon somewhat more heavily by larger firms now than in the early 1980s. For the protection of product innovations, secrecy now appears to be much more heavily employed across most industries than previously. Our results on the motives to patent indicate that firms patent for reasons that often extend beyond directly profiting from a patented innovation through either its commercialization or licensing. In addition to the prevention of copying, the most prominent motives for patenting include the prevention of rivals from patenting related inventions (i.e., "patent blocking"), the use of patents in negotiations and the prevention of suits. We find that firms commonly patent for different reasons in "discrete" product industries, such as chemicals, versus "complex" product industries, such as telecommunications equipment or semiconductors. In the former, firms appear to use their patents commonly to block the development of substitutes by rivals, and in the latter, firms are much more likely to use patents to force rivals into negotiations.

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“…As a remedy, firms build "patent fences" (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2007, p. 87;Reitzig, 2004b) by patenting not only the initial invention but also variations such as different geometric shapes (Granstrand, 1999, p. 220). Jointly these patents, and even pending applications, make it costlier to invent around, and they sometimes even block competitors (Granstrand, 1999;Cohen et al, 2000;Kash and Kingston, 2001;Arundel and Patel, 2003;Blind et al, 2009;Jell et al, 2013).…”

Section: Changes In the Effectiveness Of Patentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Offensive Patent Portfolio Races

Jell¹,

Henkel²,

Wallin³

2017

Long Range Planning

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In a patent portfolio race, firms attempt to assemble a large collection of patents. Traditional explanations for patent portfolio races rest on an assumption of fragmented patent ownership where multiple unknown firms employ defensive strategies to forestall holdup. However, patent portfolio races can be observed when patent ownership is concentrated to the hands of a few firms. To explore patent portfolio races under conditions of concentrated ownership we turn to the newspaper printing machine industry, an industry characterized by a few dominant firms. Using multiple sources -patent analysis, archival data, and interviews -we identify antecedents to a phenomenon we label offensive patent portfolio races. Contrary to received wisdom, we find that patent portfolio races can be offensive, aimed at gaining rather than avoiding loss of competitive advantage. Offensive patent portfolio races hinge on the breakdown of cooperation -triggered by changes in the perceived benefits, effectiveness, and/or costs of patents, partly mediated by the adoption of a gain frame towards increased patenting, and regulated by the potential losses from further increases. We explain the behavior by invoking the folk theorem in game theory and conclude that while triggering offensive patent portfolio races may yield temporary advantages, managers are advised to tread carefully as offensive patent portfolio races may have severe implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of the innovation process.Keywords: Patent strategy, motives to patent, intellectual property, patent thickets Acknowledgments: The authors are especially grateful to Rosemarie Ziedonis, Arvids Ziedonis, Rebecca Eisenberg, Dietmar Harhoff, and members of the strategy department at Stephen M. Ross School of Business for providing valuable comments on our study. We are indebted to the Editor of Long Range Planning, Gianvito Lanzolla, and two anonymous referees for numerous suggestions that greatly improved the paper. We furthermore thank participants at various conferences for valuable comments.

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Patents in a world of complex technologies

Cited by 51 publications

References 4 publications

Gender-specific patterns in patenting and publishing

Gender-specific patterns in patenting and publishing

Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)

Offensive Patent Portfolio Races

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