Past and Future Non-Existence

Johansson, Jens

doi:10.1007/s10892-012-9137-3

Cited by 20 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…John Martin Fischer notably makes use of this distinction in his (2009). For criticisms of this move, see Johansson (2013) and for a response, see Fischer and Brueckner (2014).…”

Section: Doomsday Needn't Be So Bad 285mentioning

confidence: 99%

Doomsday Needn’t Be So Bad

Timmerman¹

2018

Dialectica

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In his Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler provides a compelling argument that people would see less reason and be significantly less motivated to pursue most of their life's projects if they were to discover that there is no collective afterlife (i.e. future generations of humans continuing to exist after they die). Scheffler focuses on how people would react to learning there is no collective afterlife. In this paper, I focus on issues concerning how people ought to react to learning there is no collective afterlife. Answers to this question lead to surprising conclusions that challenge some of the normative claims Scheffler seems disposed to endorse. This paper has two central aims. First, I attempt to show that negative attitudes toward the lack of a collective afterlife are warranted for two reasons that have been heretofore overlooked. Interestingly, such reasons leave open the possibility that it can be appropriate to lament the lack of a collective afterlife even if it is not bad, all things considered, for anyone. Second, I argue that the lack of a collective afterlife need not be bad, all things considered, for most people. This is because there could be a sufficient number of meaningful projects available to people that would compensate for the loss of pro tanto value caused by the lack of a collective afterlife. These considerations lead to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that the lack of a collective afterlife need not negatively affect the total value of anyone's life, yet it may still be appropriate to lament the fact that there is no collective afterlife.

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“…John Martin Fischer notably makes use of this distinction in his (2009). For criticisms of this move, see Johansson (2013) and for a response, see Fischer and Brueckner (2014).…”

Section: Doomsday Needn't Be So Bad 285mentioning

confidence: 99%

Doomsday Needn’t Be So Bad

Timmerman¹

2018

Dialectica

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“…If the rationality of one's attitudes makes a difference to how intrinsically well off one is, it makes a difference to how intrinsically well off one is in the world in which the attitudes are rational . Specifically, it can't make one better off in a world in which one is born earlier than in the actual world, that in the actual world it's not rational for one to care about pleasures before one's (actual) birth (Johansson 2013, 2014a, 2014b).…”

Section: Second Solution: Bias Toward the Futurementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Objection 3 (Johansson 2005: ch. 5, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Bradley 2009: chs. 1, 3; Bykvist 2007): Feldman calls V ( w , s ) not only ‘the intrinsic value of w for s ’, but also s 's welfare level at w .…”

Section: Objections and Repliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How A-theoretic Deprivationists Should Respond to Lucretius

Deng¹

2015

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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ABSTRACT:What, if anything, makes death bad for the deceased themselves? Deprivationists hold that death is bad for the deceased iff it deprives them of intrinsic goods they would have enjoyed had they lived longer. This view faces the problem that birth too seems to deprive one of goods one would have enjoyed had one been born earlier, so that it too should be bad for one. There are two main approaches to the problem. In this paper, I explore the second approach, by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer, and suggest that it can be developed so as to meet deprivationists’ needs. On the resulting view, metaphysical differences between the future and the past give rise to a corresponding axiological difference in the intrinsic value of future and past experiences. As experiences move into the past, they lose their intrinsic value for the person.

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“…Some philosophers provide a value‐based interpretation of Lucretius (Feldman (); Glannon (); Johansson (); Kaufman ()) Others provide an attitude‐based interpretation (Belshaw (); Brueckner and Fischer (); Rosenbaum ()). See, also, Warren () for an extended discussion of the relationship between Lucretius, his arguments, and the Epicurean tradition.…”

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confidence: 99%