Party Strategies on Territorial Reform: State-wide Parties and the State of Autonomies in Spain

Verge, Tània

doi:10.1080/01402382.2013.749658

Cited by 29 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…The counterfactual argument is important, as several authors have argued that the preferences of the party are played out differently, depending on whether the party is in government or in opposition. 34 To conclude, although nationalist preferences seem to play a very significant role, it is not possible to fully confirm the second "political" hypothesis fully (Statewide parties whose ideology values the role of the state in providing national coherence will support recentralization). Further research and a triangulation of findings through elite interviews may be needed in order to assert the relevance of ideology in explaining policy outputs.…”

Section: Why Recentralization?mentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Simply put, political decentralization would be the result of legislative bargaining between statewide parties and regional demands for territorial autonomy or independence. 23 Hence, the third "political" hypothesis is the following:…”

Section: When Do Countries Recentralize?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The governments of the autonomous communities of the Canary Islands, the Basque Country, and Catalonia, all of which were ruled by nationalist parties, voiced their opposition to the government's reversal of decentralization. 34 …”

Section: Rationalization or Recentralization?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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When Do Countries Recentralize? Ideology and Party Politics in the Age of Austerity

Muro

2015

Nationalism and Ethnic Politics

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Section: Why Recentralization?mentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: When Do Countries Recentralize?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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When Do Countries Recentralize? Ideology and Party Politics in the Age of Austerity

Muro

2015

Nationalism and Ethnic Politics

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“…In other words, they take parties as the starting point (Allern, 2010;Allern and Bale, 2012;Schwartz, 2005;Verge, 2013). This article contributes to this literature by looking at party and interest group interactions starting from an interest group perspective.…”

Section: Power and Position Alignment In Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Interest groups supply parties with important information about the policy preferences of key constituencies (Easton, 1957). This argument has been repeatedly made for national legislatures (Allern, 2010;Otjes and Rasmussen, 2015;Verge, 2013) but also holds true for party groups in the EP (Marshall, 2015). The EP and its party groups are expected to represent the interests of citizens in EU public policymaking (Michalowitz, 2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Power and position

Bruycker

2016

Party Politics

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Due to the politicization of much policymaking in the European Union (EU) policymaking and the growing competences of the European Parliament (EP), party groups in the EP have become key targets for organized interests. This article investigates which party groups in the EP are prioritized by EU lobbyists and why. The focus is on two presumed key components of this prioritization process, namely power and position. It is expected that lobbyists take into account both the extent to which parties align with their views and their legislative power. The empirical analysis draws on interviews with 143 interest group officials and their lobbying expenditures on 78 legislative proposals initiated by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010. The analysis suggests that the media prominence of party groups in relation to specific issues as well as the extent to which interest organizations and party groups adopt opposing policy positions considerably shape how party groups in the EP are targeted by lobbyists.

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A Consociational Compromise? Constitutional Evolution in Spain and Catalonia

Anderson

2020

Power-Sharing in Europe

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This chapter examines the prospects of a consociational compromise in Spain and Catalonia as a response to the protracted constitutional stalemate between the two governments. While Spain's transition to democracy in the late 1970s had a clear consociational tinge, it has since evolved toward the entrenchment of a majoritarian and mononational interpretation of the state, hostile to its plurinational reality and to minority nationalist aspirations in territories like Catalonia. Hitherto, no institutional resolution has been found to satisfy the demands of both sides. This chapter argues that consociational philosophy has much to offer to Spain and Catalonia. While a more consensual approach to politics is crucial to thawing the frosty relations between the pro-and anti-independence sides, the development of a fully-fledged consociational system has yet to gain much traction.

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Party Strategies on Territorial Reform: State-wide Parties and the State of Autonomies in Spain

Cited by 29 publications

References 42 publications

When Do Countries Recentralize? Ideology and Party Politics in the Age of Austerity

When Do Countries Recentralize? Ideology and Party Politics in the Age of Austerity

Power and position

A Consociational Compromise? Constitutional Evolution in Spain and Catalonia

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