Party Polarization in Congress

Theriault, Sean M.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790652

Cited by 415 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 133 publications

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“…Despite the dispute over mass polarization (Abramowitz 2010;Abramowitz and Saunders 2008;Fiorina et al 2006), most agree that voters are better sorted along party lines and that they increasingly match their partisanship with their ideological preferences (Hetherington 2001;Levendusky 2009). Lastly, party activists have become increasingly extreme (Fiorina et al 2006;Layman and Carsey 2002;Layman et al 2010;Theriault 2008). Because activists participate in primaries, contribute money to candidates, and spend their time working on campaigns, they have a greater impact on the electoral process than ordinary voters.…”

Section: The Decline Of Moderates In the Us Congressmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Newly empowered party leaders have assumed greater responsibility in allocating committee assignments, setting the legislative agenda, and structuring debate on the floor (Cox and McCubbins 2005;Sinclair 2006). Majority party leaders draw extensively on legislative procedure to exert their will, and the resulting polarization on procedural issues has exacerbated the disparity between the two parties (Sinclair 2006;Theriault 2008). Moreover, party leaders are more extreme than the median member of the party caucus (Grofman et al 2002;Heberlig et al 2006;Jessee and Malhotra 2011), and they may move the party's agenda closer to their own preferences (Cox and McCubbins 1993;Roberts and Smith 2003).…”

Section: The Decline Of Moderates In the Us Congressmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, potential candidates rely on the party's reputation to assess their future policy impact and their prospective influence in the legislative chamber (Fenno 1973). Members of Congress experience intense pressure to support the party's legislative agenda, and those who defect can expect to be punished for their actions and denied party rewards (Sinclair 2006;Theriault 2008).…”

Section: A Party Fit Explanation For Polarization In Congressmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ideological Moderates Won’t Run: How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress

Thomsen

2014

The Journal of Politics

108

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Scholars have focused on elite-level and mass-level changes to explain partisan polarization in Congress. This article offers a candidate entry explanation for the persistence of polarization and the rise in asymmetric polarization. The central claim is that ideological conformity with the party-what I call Party Fit-influences the decision to run for office, and I suggest that partisan polarization in Congress has discouraged ideological moderates in the pipeline from pursuing a congressional career. I test this hypothesis with a survey of state legislators and with ideology estimates of state legislators who did and did not run for Congress from 2000 to 2010. I find that liberal Republican and conservative Democratic state legislators are less likely to run for Congress than those at the ideological poles, though this disparity is especially pronounced among Republicans. The findings provide an additional explanation for recent patterns of polarization in Congress. This article contributes to the polarization literature by offering a candidate entry explanation that highlights ideological variation in the types of candidates who run for Congress.The central claim is that ideological conformity with the party's ideological reputation-what I call Party Fit-influences the decision to run for office. A party's ideological reputation conveys information about the type of candidate that belongs in the party, and potential candidates draw on this reputation to determine if they can achieve their electoral and policy goals and to decide whether to run for office. The Party Fit hypothesis suggests that in the contemporary political context, partisan polarization in Congress has discouraged ideological moderates in the political pipeline from pursuing a congressional career. I test this hypothesis with survey data of the perceptions of state legislators (Maestas et al. 2006;Stone et al. 2004) article focuses on the self-selection mechanism. However, the argument does not preclude a role for parties, and it is likely that party recruitment also shapes perceptions of Party Fit. In addition, the theoretical expectations apply to both incumbent and non-incumbent candidates, but because replacement processes have been central to the rise in polarization, I focus on the latter, and more specifically, on non-incumbents who are well situated to run for Congress.There are many reasons to expect that potential candidates rely on the party's reputation to determine if they can achieve their electoral and policy goals (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974). 3 First, potential candidates draw on this reputation to estimate their likelihood of winning. Sniderman and Stiglitz (2012) show that candidates receive a reputational premium if they take a 3 Potential candidates can learn about the party's reputation through a variety of ways, such as polls, the media, and past candidates, but the ideological makeup of the party delegation is the best measure of the party's reputation. What is important is that this reputation provides diffe...

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Section: The Decline Of Moderates In the Us Congressmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Decline Of Moderates In the Us Congressmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Party Fit Explanation For Polarization In Congressmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Ideological Moderates Won’t Run: How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress

Thomsen

2014

The Journal of Politics

108

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“…First, increased levels of income inequality at the national level has been correlated with increased levels of polarization and smaller majorities in the legislature should also lead to more polarization as the parties have incentives to remain united (McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2006;Theriault, 2008;Riker, 1962;Garand, 2010).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Polarization, Inequality, and the State Legislatures

May¹,

Pirch²

2016

JPL

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While legislative polarization at the national level has been carefully examined and largely explained, the causes of polarization in state legislatures have been more elusive. Studies examining factors such as gerrymandering and party primaries as possible explanations have found largely undetectable or at best very modest relationships between these variables and levels of polarization. This paper provides an explanation of state legislative polarization based on socio-economic and demographic factors within the states. Economics and demographics have long played a significant role in understanding party choice, vote choice, the decision to abstain or vote, and support for various policies. Because of this we explore if these factors also influence polarization of state legislatures. Utilizing the Shorr-McCarty polarization data for state legislatures, which provides the differences between the mean Democratic and Republican legislator scores, and controlling for important economic and demographic factors, we explain a significant amount of the polarization existing in state legislatures. These findings present a fascinating look into not only the root causes of polarization in state legislatures, but also point to some fundamental differences in politics and ideology at the state and national levels.

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“…This has expanded beyond the use of committee power in order to block bills in Congress. There has been increased use of procedural rules to modify the extent of debate and filibusters in the Senate to block policy enactment (see [31]). These mechanisms have both direct effects in delaying or blocking policy action and indirect effects in advocates' reshaping policy proposals in order to avert partisan use of procedural maneuvers.…”

Section: Partisan Conflict and Veto Pointsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Limits to the Processing of Policy Problems

May

Jochim

Pump

2013

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This contribution addresses political limits to the processing of policy problems in the United States. Our foci are the forces that limit policymakers' attention to different aspects of problems and how this affects the prospects for problem resolution. We theorize about three sets of forces: interest engagement, linkages among relevant institutions for policymaking, and partisan conflict. We show how the interplay of these forces limits efforts to address complex problems. Based on secondary accounts, we consider these underlying dynamics for ten complex problems. These include the thorny problems of the financial crisis, climate change, and health care; the persistent problems of K-12 education, drug abuse, and food safety; and the looming problems associated with critical infrastructure, the obesity epidemic, ocean health, and terrorism and extreme events. From these accounts we identify different patterns that we label fractured, allied, bureaucratic, and anemic policymaking.

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Party Polarization in Congress

Cited by 415 publications

References 133 publications

Ideological Moderates Won’t Run: How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress

Ideological Moderates Won’t Run: How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress

Polarization, Inequality, and the State Legislatures

Political Limits to the Processing of Policy Problems

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