Party nomination strategies in flexible-list systems: Do preference votes matter for realistic list positions?

Abstract

Previous studies on flexible-list systems demonstrate that party selectorates promote candidates with a high number of preference votes to better list positions in the next election. This research note asks whether these rank promotions are limited to candidates in unrealistic list positions at the lower end of the ballot or also include candidates moving into realistic list positions (i.e. electorally safer highest ranks). Using a longitudinal data set of candidates for 18 parliamentary elections in Flanders (Belgium), we first successfully replicate the earlier established preference vote-effect on future list positions, but subsequently show that promotions from unrealistic to realistic positions are relatively rare. Moreover, preference votes do not seem to affect the ability to move upwards on the list or to receive a realistic position at the next election when controlling for incumbency and list position at the previous election. Robustness tests using different operationalizations for realistic position lead to similar empirical results. Preference votes do not seem to matter for realistic list positions.

Mavericks or Loyalists? Popular Ballot Jumpers and Party Discipline in the Flexible-List PR Context

“…Political parties need all their votes to maximize their influence over policy and satisfy the expectations of their core electorates. Recent findings indicate that preference voting might not have as strong an influence on the internal functioning of the PR system as previously believed (Buisseret and Prato 2020;Carroll and Nalepa 2021;Folke and Rickne 2020;Put, Smulders, and Maddens 2019;Wauters, Bouteca, and de Vet 2019). Emboldened by this evidence, this article put forward an argument that senior party officials will try to limit the effect of preference voting on their ability to enforce party discipline within their ranks.…”

“…Recent research offers some crucial evidence in support of this expectation (Buisseret and Prato 2020; Carroll and Nalepa 2021; Folke and Rickne 2020; Däubler 2021). Put et al (2019), for instance, show that while there indeed is a robust, positive correlation between preference-vote tallies and candidates’ subsequent ballot placement, popular candidates are seldom promoted from hopeless to safe ballot spots by political parties. Wauters et al (2019) find no evidence of growing personalization of legislative behavior in the FL context of Belgium, despite using multiple measures of the concept.…”

“…Third, to minimize the risk of ballot reshuffles, party organizations will strive to design candidate ballots that their voters find appealing. This might involve placing their most popular party insiders on the top of their ballots as a form of voter enticement (Nagtzaam and van Erkel 2017; Put, Smulders, and Maddens 2019). If this strategy works, the lion share of preference votes will be concentrated around the party’s topmost candidates and will therefore have no impact on the seat-allocation order (Beblavý and Veselková 2014).…”

The good, the loyal or the active? MPs’ parliamentary performance and the achievement of static and progressive career ambitions in parliament

“…Although party selectors do take candidates' personal electoral reputations into account (André et al, 2017), these may be less important for the attribution of realistic list positions (Put et al, 2021). The fact that legislators in Belgiumlike in many other countriesdisplay high levels of party loyalty (Depauw and Martin, 2008), has often been an argument to disregard MPs' voting behaviour in those contexts.…”

Ballot position effects in open-list PR systems: the moderating impact of postal voting

“…As also pointed out by Blom-Hansen et al (2016), the studies discussed above differ in their ability to identify the causal effect of candidates' list ranking. Because ballot order is usually not random, but reflects the evaluation of candidates by party selectors (e.g., Put et al 2019;Crisp et al 2013;Folke et al 2016), it is not surprising that candidates at the top of the ballot receive more votes. It is also well known that the top-ranked candidates receive more campaign support by the party leadership and receive more media attention, which also increases their chances of being selected by voters (van Erkel and Thijssen 2016; Devroe and Wauters 2020).…”