Party Competition and Preferences for Inter-regional Redistribution in Spain

Amat, Francesc

doi:10.1080/13608746.2012.701897

Cited by 21 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 8 publications

(8 reference statements)

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“…However, the feeling of national identity and cultural distinctiveness among the majority of the people of the Basque Country and Catalonia is much larger and politically more contentious. Amat (2012) demonstrates that preferences for redistribution in these out-group regions are significantly different from other regions. 14.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Preferences for Inter-Regional Redistribution

Balcells

Fernández-Albertos

Kuo

2015

Comparative Political Studies

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What explains individual support for inter-regional redistribution? Few studies examine support for regional redistribution, even though such issues are politically salient in many democracies. We test models that hypothesize that such preferences are affected by regional and individual income, as well as other arguments beyond the traditional political economy framework. We focus on informational assumptions and implications of these models with an experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey in Spain. We randomly inform some citizens of the true relative income of their region to assess the impact of this information on regional redistribution preferences. We find that citizens' learning about their region's relative position affects these preferences in a manner consistent with some of the political economy models. We also find some support for out-group concerns as an important factor. The findings have implications for the applicability of economic models to explaining support for regional arrangements.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Preferences for Inter-Regional Redistribution

Balcells

Fernández-Albertos

Kuo

2015

Comparative Political Studies

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“…While identity, cultural values, and immigration are attracting most of the current scholarly attention, territorial lines of conflict are a key but understudied second dimension of competition in the issue competition literature (Amat, 2012). Political and economic disparities across regions have increased dramatically in a globalized world, where some territories attract more foreign investment, tourism, and highly skilled workers than others within the confines of the same national state.…”

Section: Territorial Conflicts As a Political Dimension Of Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic performance and center-periphery conflicts in party competition

Pardos‐Prado

Sagarzazu

2019

Party Politics

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The reasons pushing parties to politicize non-economic dimensions of competition, and the consequences of this for the representation of public opinion, are badly understood in the party competition literature. This is a pressing research gap, especially given the recent and significant re-activation of territorial or center-periphery conflicts in Western Europe. In this paper, we first argue that bad macroeconomic performance increases the incentives of incumbent parties to deviate the attention towards territorial conflicts in order to avoid electoral punishment. Secondly, we also argue that the opposite is true for public opinion: it is precisely during periods of bad economic performance and high economic concern, when the electorate moves away from territorial interests. The dynamic emerging from our findings is thus far from an ideal bottom-up representation: elites divert the attention towards territorial conflicts to mask periods of poor economic performance, which is precisely when public opinion is less interested in center-periphery issues. We validate our claims using text analysis of party attention in Spain, and time series models covering four electoral cycles (1996-2011). * The order of authors names reflects the principle of rotation. Both authors have contributed equally to all work.

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“…Equalisation can either be achieved through horizontal transfers between subnational governments or through vertical payments from the central government to subnational governments or through a combination of the two. As a programme meant to correct territorial imbalances, fiscal equalisation is explicitly redistributive and often highly controversial (Blöchliger et al 2007;Amat 2012;Beramendi 2012). As a programme meant to correct territorial imbalances, fiscal equalisation is explicitly redistributive and often highly controversial (Blöchliger et al 2007;Amat 2012;Beramendi 2012).…”

Section: Institutional Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While some decentralised countries have extensive fiscal equalisation systems that reduce fiscal disparities among subnational governments to practically zero, others have no institutionalised system of fiscal equalisation (Blöchliger et al 2007). As a programme meant to correct territorial imbalances, fiscal equalisation is explicitly redistributive and often highly controversial (Blöchliger et al 2007;Amat 2012;Beramendi 2012). Some scholars have therefore viewed fiscal equalisation as endogenous to the degree of party system nationalisation, arguing that it is more contested and therefore less institutionalised in weakly nationalised party systems (Beramendi 2012).…”

Section: Institutional Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Redistributive policies in decentralised systems: The effect of decentralisation on subnational social spending

Kleider

2017

European J Political Res

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This article uses cross‐national data to examine the effects of fiscal and political decentralisation on subnational governments’ social expenditures. It revisits the benefit competition hypothesis put forward by fiscal federalism research, which posits that subnational governments in decentralised countries match welfare benefit reductions by their peers to keep taxes low and avoid an in‐migration of welfare dependents. As a consequence, subnational social expenditures are assumed to plateau at similar and low levels. Using a new cross‐national dataset on social expenditures in 334 subnational units across 14 countries and 21 years, the author explores whether benefit competition causes subnational governments to converge on similar levels of social spending. The analysis reveals that as countries decentralise, subnational social spending levels begin to diverge rather than converge, with some subnational governments reducing their social expenditures and others increasing them. Furthermore, decentralisation is not likely to be associated with lowest common denominator social policies, but with more variability in social expenditure. The article also examines the effects of other macro‐level institutions and demonstrates that policy coordination influences the relationship between decentralisation and subnational social spending levels.

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Party Competition and Preferences for Inter-regional Redistribution in Spain

Cited by 21 publications

References 8 publications

Preferences for Inter-Regional Redistribution

Preferences for Inter-Regional Redistribution

Economic performance and center-periphery conflicts in party competition

Redistributive policies in decentralised systems: The effect of decentralisation on subnational social spending

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