Party Coalitions and Interest Group Networks

Abstract

We analyze affiliation networks of interest groups that endorse the same candidates in primary elections, donate to the same candidates in general elections, and voice support for the same legislative proposals. Patterns of interest group ties resemble two competing party coalitions in elections but not in legislative debate. Campaign endorsement and financial contribution ties among interest groups are consistently correlated but legislative ties do not follow directly from electoral alliances. The results challenge the consensus in the emerging literature on the expanded party organization; interest groups have distinct incentives to join together in a party coalition in elections but also to build bipartisan grand coalitions to pursue legislative goals. We also modify conventional views on party differences. The Democratic coalition is not fractured into many small constituencies. The Democratic campaign and legislative networks are denser than equivalent Republican networks, with a core of labor organizations occupying central positions.

Interest group influence on US policy change: An assessment based on policy history

“…Third, there is some ideological clustering, separation between conservative and liberal groups. This is consistent with interest group electoral networks but not with their legislative networks (Grossmann and Dominguez, 2009). Table 4 reports some quantitative measures of these features of the network, alongside lists of the most central groups in the network.…”

“…First, the figure has a core set of interest groups closely connected to one another and a larger periphery of less connected groups. This is consistent with interest group legislative networks (Grossmann and Dominguez, 2009), but less consistent with networks of working relationships among lobbyists (Heinz et al, 1993). Second, conservative groups are not as common as liberal groups and are less central in the overall network.…”

“…Heinz et al (1993), for example, find that most policy conflicts feature a 'hollow core', with no one serving as a central player, arbitrating conflict. Grossmann and Dominguez (2009), in contrast, find a core-periphery structure to interest group coalitions, with some advocacy groups, unions and business peak associations playing central roles. Yet most network analyses are based on endorsement lists or reported working relationships, rather than influence.…”

Is Transparency an Anti-Corruption Myth?

“…Instead we consider a long run game of qui pro quo between people who alternate in positions in power (Reuben, 2002). This approach has a long history in the study of the political influence of interest groups (Olson, 1965;Heinz et al , 1990;Mitchell & Munger, 1991;Reuben, 2002;Beyers et al , 2008;Grossmann & Dominguez, 2009), and broadly incorporates the phenomena of nepotism, cronyism, and the revolving door of personnel between elite positions in government and private sector (Etzion & Davis, 2008;i Vidal et al , 2012;Moore, 2014). This is almost invariably seen as unethical behaviour, but is not always seen as corruption from a legal standpoint.…”

When reciprocity becomes back-scratching: an economic inquiry

“…Instead we consider that the process of alliance, or group, formation dominates the allocation of rents when the opportunity to preference loyal group members is available in a long run game of qui pro quo (Reuben, 2002). This approach has a long history in the study of the political influence of interest groups (Olson, 1965;Heinz et al , 1990;Mitchell & Munger, 1991;Reuben, 2002;Beyers et al , 2008;Grossmann & Dominguez, 2009), and broadly incorporates the phenomena of nepotism, cronyism, and the revolving door of personnel between elite positions in government and private sector (Etzion & Davis, 2008;i Vidal et al , 2012;Moore, 2014).…”