Partnering for Troop Supply

Daniel, Donald C.

doi:10.1080/13533312.2011.598317

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…On the resource front, in particular, a concurrent rise in the number of peacekeepers deployed globally (Providing for Peacekeeping, no date(a)) and in the fee that the UN was willing to pay to governments for each troop deployed to a UN mission (Coleman and Nyblade, 2018: 728) meant that leaders in (low-income) countries soon found that they could ‘profit’ from contributing to peacekeeping (see Gaibulloev et al, 2015). This is because payments for peacekeepers were (and still are) typically transferred directly to ministries or governments’ central coffers (Coleman, 2014: 28), and so governing elites that paid their own troops less than the rate of UN reimbursement (then around $1000 per troop, per month) stood to earn rent from supplying peacekeepers to the UN’s increasingly large missions (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997; see also Daniel, 2011: 541).…”

Section: Theoretical Framework: Benefits Costs and Regime-specific Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voted out: Regime type, elections and contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations

Duursma

Gledhill

2019

European Journal of International Relations

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Previous research has suggested that leaders of democratic regimes are particularly willing to contribute troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations because backing ‘liberal’ peacekeeping allows them to support the diffusion of liberal institutions. However, evidence used to sustain this argument is based on contribution patterns during the decade of peacekeeping that followed the Cold War. In this article, we argue that there has been a reversal in the relative willingness of democratic and non-democratic governments to provide the United Nations with peacekeepers since then. Specifically, we propose that the introduction of more ‘robust’ forms of peacekeeping during the 1990s has rendered democratic governments reluctant to contribute large numbers of peacekeepers to United Nations operations because elected leaders are now concerned that voters may object to the deployment of national troops to high-risk humanitarian missions in which there is no clear national interest. By contrast, non-democratic leaders partly discount public opinion because they are less reliant on popular support to retain power. Thus, when non-democrats see that contributing troops to United Nations peacekeeping will bring them reputational and/or resource benefits, they are willing to contribute peacekeepers — and on a large scale. We test our claims quantitatively. We find that since the 1990s, democratic governments have remained more likely than non-democrats to contribute some troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations, but non-democratic governments have been more likely to make large-scale contributions. We also find that governments have been especially reluctant to make sizeable contributions to peacekeeping when elections have been on the horizon.

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Section: Theoretical Framework: Benefits Costs and Regime-specific Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voted out: Regime type, elections and contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations

Duursma

Gledhill

2019

European Journal of International Relations

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“…First, I find that democracies are no more likely to participate in any given UN peacekeeping mission than are non-democracies (see Lebovic, 2004). Daniel (2011) suggests that the UN should draw more heavily from democracies interested in promoting a Western agenda globally when trying to fulfill its mandated troop levels, and Bellamy & Williams (2013) note that it is important for these Western democracies to contribute, as they have better military capabilities to assist the UN. However, my results indicate that democratic interests are similar to those of non-democracies: they are not likely to become involved in peacekeeping unless the crisis threatens them directly.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Participation in peacekeeping provides democracies the means to both respond to domestic pressures to provide humanitarian relief abroad and help further liberal norms of conflict resolution in other countries (e.g. Daniel, 2011; Lebovic, 2004; Marten, 2004). In this manner, peacekeeping allows democracies to further their interests and promote the status quo from which they benefit (Neack, 1995).…”

Section: Existing Scholarshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Refugee flows and state contributions to post-Cold War UN peacekeeping missions

Uzonyi

2015

Journal of Peace Research

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Why do states participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions? Extant theory revolves around two benefits states derive from participation: the financial benefits participants receive for their contributions and the ability to further liberal norms abroad. Yet, these theories have received limited empirical support. In addition, they cannot explain where and when leaders send troops. To rectify these limitations, I focus on a more straightforward benefit states receive from limiting conflict and providing stability to war-torn regions. Namely, stabilizing conflict areas helps stem the externalities caused from ongoing conflicts, such as refugees. This explanation of participation in peacekeeping predicts who is most likely to send support (those fearing refugee inflows), the size of contribution (increasing relative to the inflows), and where they send assistance (to the specific conflict area producing the externalities). Statistical analysis of all UN peacekeeping missions since 1990 provides support for this argument and reveals that refugee flows better predict who is likely to contribute troops, and to what conflict, than the size of those contributions. While other realpolitik considerations strongly influence which states participate in UN peacekeeping, neither democracy nor state need is a statistically significant explanator of who contributes. However, state need does predict the size of contribution.

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Partnering for Troop Supply

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Voted out: Regime type, elections and contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations

Voted out: Regime type, elections and contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations

Refugee flows and state contributions to post-Cold War UN peacekeeping missions

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