Partner-specific behavior in social networks: Coordination among actors with heterogeneous preferences

Gerwen, Nikki van; Buskens, Vincent

doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2017.05.006

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

(36 reference statements)

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“…van Gerwen and Buskens [26] suggests a variant of the language game similar to our version but in a model with networks to study the influence of partner-specific behavior on coordination. Concerning auctions theory, He [27] studies a framework where each individual of a population divided into two types has to choose between two skills: a "majority" and a "minority" one.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition

Rozzi

2021

Games

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We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information’s cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group’s favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups’ sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition

Rozzi

2021

Games

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“…The probability of choosing either α or β is updated towards what would have been the best choice the previous round. Earlier research investigated the response behavior of human subjects in iterated ‘battle of the sexes’ games in two types of ring networks 28,29 . This study found that 96 percent of the decisions of the subjects followed a myopic best response pattern.…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

An experimental study of network effects on coordination in asymmetric games

Broere

Buskens

Stoof

et al. 2019

Sci Rep

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Network structure has often proven to be important in understanding the decision behavior of individuals or agents in different interdependent situations. Computational studies predict that network structure has a crucial influence on behavior in iterated 2 by 2 asymmetric ‘battle of the sexes’ games. We test such behavioral predictions in an experiment with 240 human subjects. We found that as expected the less ‘random’ the network structure, the better the experimental results are predictable by the computational models. In particular, there is an effect of network clustering on the heterogeneity of convergence behavior in the network. We also found that degree centrality and having an even degree are important predictors of the decision behavior of the subjects in the experiment. We thus find empirical validation of predictions made by computational models in a computerized experiment with human subjects.

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Partner-specific behavior in social networks: Coordination among actors with heterogeneous preferences

Cited by 2 publications

References 23 publications

Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition

Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition

An experimental study of network effects on coordination in asymmetric games

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