Partisanship and tax competition in the American states

Abstract

Existing research identifies partisan differences in taxing choices made by state governments. Research has also found that, even when controlling for intrastate characteristics such as party, jurisdictions respond to the taxing decisions of their neighbours, particularly when citizens can easily cross-border shop. These studies treat political and competitive factors as independent influences on taxes. We suggest they are more likely to interact in taxing decisions. We argue that the political costs of cross-border shopping are higher for Republicans, and the threat of it should have a greater negative impact on taxes when that party controls major state policy-making institutions. Our analyses of state cigarette taxes between 1980 and 2011 confirm that a higher threat of cross-border shopping has a larger negative impact on taxes under Republican governors. We conclude that, by missing the interaction between partisanship and the threat of fiscal mobility, previous work misestimates key influences on tax competition.

Impact of Internal Control in Enterprises Founded by Local Self-Government Units: The Case of Republic of Serbia

“…The non-indivisible part of the management of the company represents the correct evaluation (Svoboda, 2007;Liu, 2010;Horton et al, 2011;Drazic-Lutilsky et al, 2012;Durocher & Gendron, 2014;Liang & Riedl, 2014;Popovic et al, 2015; ) parts of the company and all other factors related to the rational management of the management. Essential such an approach requires the adoption of longterm business decisions at the level of the entire economy (Perry & Shivdasani, 2005;Davis & Nicholson-Crotty, 2016), to enable a realistic development of the economy of a state (Topcu & Serap Coban, 2017).…”

Lights, Camera, but No Action? Tax and Economic Development Lessons From State Motion Picture Incentive Programs

“…In their defense, policymakers do not always receive consistent direction from voters. Although policymakers do incorporate public needs when resolving the trade-offs inherent to scarce budgeting (Nicholson-Crotty, Theobald, & Wood, 2006), voter responses at the ballot box are inconsistent, shaped by incumbency, party identification, and other factors (Davis & Nicholson-Crotty, 2015;Lowry, Alt, & Ferree, 1998;Turner, 2003). But the process is not without hope for reform, and the preceding results on MPIs can be simplified to improve future economic development practices.…”

Gasoline Tax Increases in the American States: A Case for Responsive Taxation

“…However, fears of electoral retribution will lead all governments to strategically avoid tax increases during election years (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985; Berry and Berry 1992). Gubernatorial elections were chosen because governors are the drivers of fiscal policy in their states and they are often held responsible at the polls for tax increases (Kone and Winters 1993; Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 1995; Lowry, Alt, and Ferree 1998; Davis and Nicholson-Crotty 2016). Klarner (2013) provided the dichotomous measures of both of these variables.…”

“…Finally, regional diffusion may also increase political opportunities to raise taxes. Voters in one district will use the performance of neighboring jurisdictions as a yardstick by which to judge the performance of their politicians and their fiscal policies (Besley and Case 1995; Berry and Berry 1992; Nelson 2002; Davis and Nicholson-Crotty 2016). Two variables were employed to capture the effects of the diffusion of policy and competition between states.…”