Partisan bias in politicians’ perception of scandals

Abstract

Do politicians perceive scandals differently when they implicate members of their own party rather than another party? We address this question using a between-subject survey experiment, whereby we randomly assign UK local councillors (N = 2133) to vignettes describing a major national-level scandal in their own party versus another party. Our results show that local politicians perceive a significantly larger impact of this national scandal on the national party image when it concerns their own party (relative to another party). When evaluating the same scandal’s impact on the local party image, no similar effect is observed. This suggests that local politicians tone down the local impact of a national scandal more when thinking about their own party. We suggest this derives from a form of motivated reasoning whereby politicians selectively focus on information allowing a more negative view of direct electoral opponents. These findings arise independent of the type of scandal under consideration.

The politics of distributing blame and credit: Evidence from a survey experiment with Norwegian local politicians

“…We should note at this point that politicians -much like voters (e.g., Healy et al, 2014;Lodge & Hamill, 1986;Rudolph, 2003;Tilley & Hobolt, 2011) -are likely to view and interpret realworld conditions through a partisan lens (e.g., Butler & Pereira, 2018;Butler et al, 2017;Pereira, 2022;Schönhage & Geys, 2022, 2023. As strong partisans, they can, therefore, be expected to over-estimate their own party's role in creating policy successes, while seeing bad outcomes as more likely to be caused by other parties.…”

Politicians and Scandals that Damage the Party Brand

“…Unfortunately for politicians on the sidelines, scandals do not only affect voters’ evaluation of the involved politicians. They often create “spillover” effects on the evaluation of the political party of the scandal‐ridden politicians (Lee 2018; von Sikorski, Heiss, and Matthes 2020; Wolsky 2020) and can thereby cause serious damage to parties’ brand name and reputation (Daniele, Galletta, and Geys 2020; Desposato 2006; Desposato and Scheiner 2008; Lupu 2014; Schönhage and Geys 2021). As this may taint all members of the party through “guilt by association” (Goffman 1963; Kvåle and Murdoch 2021), it is critical to increase our understanding of the potential (re)actions of politicians not implicated in a given scandal.…”

“…First, extant research predominantly focuses on voter responses to scandals (e.g., Costas‐Pérez, Solé‐Ollé, and Sorribas‐Navarro 2012; Wolsky 2020) and on politicians embroiled in the scandal (e.g., Cavalcanti, Daniele, and Galletta 2018; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Peters and Welch 1980). We broaden the scope of existing work by studying politicians not personally involved in a scandal (see also Daniele, Galletta, and Geys 2020; Schönhage and Geys 2021). This draws attention to potential intraparty spillovers of scandals (Lee 2018; von Sikorski, Heiss, and Matthes 2020; Wolsky 2020) and extends our understanding of the strategic nature of political decision‐making in times of crisis.…”