Parties, Term Limits, and Representation in the U.S. States

Abstract

This research examines how severing the electoral connection influences legislative behavior. Unlike previous studies of legislative shirking, we argue for a more nuanced conceptualization that takes account of members' electoral circumstances (beyond a dichotomous measure of term limited/ nonterm limited) as well as the nature of the votes under consideration. This enables us to incorporate expectations of party influence into our model of legislative shirking. Our research demonstrates shirking among legislators leaving public office as they are no longer susceptible to party pressure, while those who face term limits and are seeking another public office may remain adherent to the party on votes most crucial to the party (i.e., procedural votes). Moreover, we find evidence that legislators who are no longer constrained by elections also exhibit a greater level of roll call abstention, although only those leaving public office demonstrate significant increases in abstentions on procedural votes. Thus, we may find very different shirking patterns among term-limited members depending on their future political ambition (or lack thereof) and also depending on the nature of the votes that we are examining.

Policy Preferences and Policy Change: Dynamic Responsiveness in the American States, 1936–2014

“…This could lead to the election of legislators who better reflect constituents’ (current) preferences. On the other hand, term limits could lead to shirking, particularly among legislators not planning to seek another office (Clark and Williams 2014). It could also lead to less experienced legislators, which might reduce their capacity to assess and respond to public opinion.…”

Electoral Rules and Legislative Particularism: Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures

“…Wright (2007) finds no significant difference in roll-call participation rates for those retiring except in state legislatures with very high workloads. Clark and Williams (2014) find evidence of shirking among members term-limited and no longer seeking public office of any sort. In contrast to the work on the U.S. case, Carey (1996) finds evidence of widespread legislative particularism among Costa Rican legislators who lack the motivation of re-election due to term limits, but are motivated through postlegislative career ambitions.…”

So far away from me? The effect of geographical distance on representation

“…While MPs may not always enjoy being present for votes, any bias resulting from a non-random sample of votes being recorded should be constant across MPs regardless of the remoteness of their constituency. Attending votes is a key representative function (Clark and Williams 2014;Rothenberg and Sanders 2000b), and serves as a good proxy for other activities which require the presence of an MP in the legislature, given the necessity of physical presence to vote and the high value placed by parties on their MPs voting.…”