Participatory Gains and Policy Effectiveness: The Open Method of Co‐ordination Information Society

Abstract

This article provides empirical findings on the relationship between the open method of co-ordination and participation (OMC). Empirically, it draws on within-case analysis to examine how participation, venues and outcomes have varied in different domains of information society policy. This is a challenging case for claims about the participatory effects of the OMC because it is not a policy originally designed to address social policy concerns or unemployment problems. The main conceptual argument is that the OMC is a political opportunity structure that distributes participatory gains. The article examines this opportunity structure by separating out the dimensions of 'procedure' and 'outcomes' and including 'transparency' as a moderating variable. The findings point to participatory effects in all but one case, although not for the same actors and at the same level (European Union or national/sub-national).

Competition Policy in Action: Regulating Tech Markets with Hierarchy and Experimentalism

“…280–1) has been systematically documented, however, it is appropriate to extend such systematic analysis to practical operation. This is the natural implication of findings that OMC implementation has often led to surprising variations (Harcourt, 2013; Heidenreich and Zeitlin, 2009; Lodge, 2007), and of claims that experimentalist architecture is not confined to the OMC. It is especially timely since cutting‐edge research focusing precisely on implementation of EU experimentalist arrangements beyond the OMC has recently shown that, while actors may ‘stumble’ and ‘stumble back’ into experimentalist governance (de Búrca, 2010; Rangoni and Zeitlin, 2020, pp.…”

“…Yet also this broader literature has thus far paid more attention to documenting the widespread emergence of experimentalist architecture than to studying its functioning in practice (de Búrca et al ., 2013, 2014; Sabel, 2004; Sabel and Simon, 2011, 2012; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008, 2010), despite findings highlighting variation in the implementation of the OMC (Harcourt, 2013; Heidenreich and Zeitlin, 2009; Lodge, 2007) as well as of other experimentalist arrangements such as forums, networks, and agencies (de Búrca, 2010, pp. 226–32; Rangoni, 2019; Weimer, 2019, pp.…”

Rabia Akhtar: The Blind Eye, U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan From Ford to Clinton

“…What often arises when approaching security issues including cybersecurity through PPP is the classic debate about whether PPP relates to binding regulations and regarding the distribution of obligations versus consideration of economic problems (Héritier, 2001). Even though far beyond that, PPP in the context of security also deals with corporate social responsibility, the openness of coordination methods, also includes speed, flexibility, reach, and support of all parties involved (Graz & Nolke, 2007;Harcourt, 2013). This is because the cyber realm continues to present special challenges in terms of technical complexity, rapid changes, diverse actors and also transnational interdependence so policymaking in a conventional way will tend to experience obstacles if it is not equipped with an alternative mechanism.…”

Constructive Criticism: Shaming, Incentives, and Human Rights Reforms

“…The need to maintain legitimacy in the presence of transnational scrutiny creates pressure for change. In other words, countries change their policies to gain international approval and to avoid international criticism (Bernstein and Cashore ; Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett ; Harcourt ; Holzinger, Knill, and Sommerer ; Kemmerling ; Meseguer ; Stone ). The ENP includes an open and public monitoring and reporting system that evaluates and grades the performance of participants in realizing their national action plans (NAPs; more on this shortly).…”