Participatory constitution-building in Fiji: A comparison of the 1993–1997 and the 2012–2013 processes

Abstract

Participatory constitution-building during times of transition from war to peace or from authoritarian to democratic rule is quickly becoming an established norm. This article analyzes and compares two Fijian participatory processes; the 1993–1997 process and the 2012–2013 process. The purpose of doing so is to understand the extent to which these processes were genuinely participatory in terms of extending the Fijians’ possibility of influencing the content of the constitution. The article concludes that these processes were merely symbolic in terms of public participation; that there is not much that public participation can achieve in and by itself; and that the sequencing of public participation and secluded political elite negotiations in the context of constitution-building during times of transition is a field of research that is in dire need of further systematic analysis, particularly as an increasing amount of post-conflict and post-authoritarian states endeavor participatory constitution-building.

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