Participatory Budgeting with Project Interactions

Jain, Pallavi; Sornat, Krzysztof; Talmon, Nimrod

doi:10.24963/ijcai.2020/54

Cited by 24 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Multiple papers in the participatory budgeting literature focus on either social welfare, representation or proportionality. For example, Goel et al [8] suggest using knapsack voting in order to improve the outcome social welfare, and Jain et al [10] consider special cases where it is possible to find a polynomial time algorithm which maximizes the social welfare. Skowron et al [21] suggest new PB voting rules and empirically evaluates their social welfare and representation.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Welfare vs. Representation in Participatory Budgeting

Fairstein¹,

Meir²,

Vilenchik³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process for allocating funds to projects based on the votes of members of the community. Different rules have been used to aggregate participants' votes. A recent paper by Lackner and Skowron [12] studied the trade-off between notions of social welfare and representation in the multi-winner voting, which is a special case of participatory budgeting with identical project costs. But there is little understanding of this trade-off in the more general PB setting. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical study of the worst-case guarantees of several common rules to better understand the trade-off between social welfare and representation. We show that many of the guarantees from the multi-winner setting do not generalize to the PB setting, and that the introduction of costs leads to substantially worse guarantees, thereby exacerbating the welfare-representation trade-off. We further study how the requirement of proportionality over voting rules effects the guarantees on social welfare and representation. We study the latter point also empirically, both on real and synthetic datasets. We show that variants of the recently suggested voting rule Rule-X (which satisfies proportionality) do very well in practice both with respect to social welfare and representation.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Welfare vs. Representation in Participatory Budgeting

Fairstein¹,

Meir²,

Vilenchik³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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“…This is important since the competition in this policy area is quite strong [7]. The most straightforward driver for project's support is the total value of its utility: the projects' potential to enhance the community's welfare [50] as emphasized above. In addition to this, we argue that five characteristics of the projects can foster public support for the proposal.…”

Section: What Drives Public Support: Five Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ecology Projects and Participatory Budgeting: Enhancing Citizens’ Support

Gherghina

Țap

2021

Sustainability

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In contemporary times, a large number of ecology projects are put on the public agenda through participatory budgeting. There is variation in the support they receive from citizens, but until now we have not known what drives this support. This article aims to identify the factors that could determine the support for ecology projects in participatory budgeting. It includes all 36 projects on ecology, which passed the technical eligibility check, submitted to the participatory budgeting in Cluj-Napoca (Romania) between 2017 and 2019. We use quantitative analysis to test the extent to which five project characteristics have an effect on the public support for the ecology projects: the requested budget, the type of project, the number of arguments, the use of jargon, and images and videos in addition to text descriptions. The results show that citizens take the environmental matters seriously and do not vote for schematic projects that are limited in scope and which have limited contribution to the general welfare.

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“…Furthermore, and also related to the fact that in our model voters provide ideal points from which their preferences is induced, an important direction for future work is to some-how lift this restriction, perhaps by allowing for different, possibly iterative, elicitation method that would allow voters to specify more involved preferences (for example, preferences regarding project interactions in participatory budgeting (Jain, Sornat, & Talmon, 2020), succinctly).…”

Section: Further Settingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aggregation over Metric Spaces: Proposing and Voting in Elections, Budgeting, and Legislation

Bulteau¹,

Shahaf²,

Shapiro³

et al. 2021

jair

Self Cite

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We present a unifying framework encompassing a plethora of social choice settings. Viewing each social choice setting as voting in a suitable metric space, we offer a general model of social choice over metric spaces, in which—similarly to the spatial model of elections—each voter specifies an ideal element of the metric space. The ideal element acts as a vote, where each voter prefers elements that are closer to her ideal element. But it also acts as a proposal, thus making all participants equal not only as voters but also as proposers. We consider Condorcet aggregation and a continuum of solution concepts, ranging from minimizing the sum of distances to minimizing the maximum distance. We study applications of our abstract model to various social choice settings, including single-winner elections, committee elections, participatory budgeting, and participatory legislation. For each setting, we compare each solution concept to known voting rules and study various properties of the resulting voting rules. Our framework provides expressive aggregation for a broad range of social choice settings while remaining simple for voters; and may enable a unified and integrated implementation for all these settings, as well as unified extensions such as sybil-resiliency, proxy voting, and deliberative decision making. We study applications of our abstract model to various social choice settings, including single-winner elections, committee elections, participatory budgeting, and participatory legislation. For each setting, we compare each solution concept to known voting rules and study various properties of the resulting voting rules. Our framework provides expressive aggregation for a broad range of social choice settings while remaining simple for voters; and may enable a unified and integrated implementation for all these settings, as well as unified extensions such as sybil-resiliency, proxy voting, and deliberative decision making.

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Participatory Budgeting with Project Interactions

Cited by 24 publications

References 22 publications

Welfare vs. Representation in Participatory Budgeting

Welfare vs. Representation in Participatory Budgeting

Ecology Projects and Participatory Budgeting: Enhancing Citizens’ Support

Aggregation over Metric Spaces: Proposing and Voting in Elections, Budgeting, and Legislation

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