Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation

Abstract

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Negotiating climate change

“…Apparently, simple game theoretic models do not sufficiently explain the outcome of negotiations. This is increasingly acknowledged by game-theorists themselves, who recognize that international cooperation can lead to reductions in transaction costs and the generation of trust (Finus and Rundshagen, 2006). Moreover, without international negotiations, the relevant actors may not even be able to acquire sufficient information to actually define their position (Haas et al 1993).…”

An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements

“…The sequential move unanimity game of Bloch (1996) could certainly be a starting point for such an alternative approach, though it seems that conceptual modifications are needed in order to capture what is really going on in negotiations leading to an IEA. Preliminary results from a stylized model with symmetric players in Finus and Rundshagen (2006) suggest that a sequential process adds another strategic dimension, making successful coalition formation even more difficult due to free-riding.Though the assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalitions (which may be interpreted as a first-best design) is frequently made in the literature, casual empirical evidence suggests that governments do not follow this rule when negotiating abatement targets. Abatement allocation is often not cost-effective and the aggregate level is not optimal from a global point of view (i.e.…”

“…The sequential move unanimity game of Bloch (1996) could certainly be a starting point for such an alternative approach, though it seems that conceptual modifications are needed in order to capture what is really going on in negotiations leading to an IEA. Preliminary results from a stylized model with symmetric players in Finus and Rundshagen (2006) suggest that a sequential process adds another strategic dimension, making successful coalition formation even more difficult due to free-riding.…”

An equitable, efficient and implementable scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions

“…We explore these issues further in Section 5. Finus and Rundshagen (2005) provide a more formal treatment. See also Sandler (1997) for a more in-depth discussion of the prisoner's dilemma problem in international environmental agreements.…”

“…See, for example,Barrett (1994),Carraro and Siniscalco (1993),Chander and Tulkens (1997),Hoel and Schneider (1997),Jeppesen and Anderson (1998), Finus (2004),and Finus and Rundshagen (2005) on the design of cooperative international environmental agreements.…”