Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice

Lee, J. Y.

doi:10.1007/s10790-021-09842-w

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2023

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“…13 Epistemic partiality seems to risk defending something similar and thus reproducing worrying epistemic injustices. (See Lee (2022)). Can epistemic partiality be defended whilst avoiding epistemic nepotism?…”

Section: Further Directions For Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Partialism

Mason

2023

Philosophy Compass

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Most of us are partial to our friends and loved ones: we treat them with special care, and we feel justified in doing so. In recent years, the idea that good friends are also epistemically partial to one another has been popular. Being a good friend, so‐called epistemic partialists suggest, involves being positively biased towards one's friends – that is, involves thinking more highly of them than is warranted by the evidence. In this paper, I outline the concept of epistemic partiality and its relation to non‐epistemic partiality and explore some considerations that speak in favour of and against such partialism in friendships. I finish by suggesting some directions in which this debate could go next.

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Section: Further Directions For Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Partialism

Mason

2023

Philosophy Compass

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Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice

Cited by 1 publication

References 34 publications

Epistemic Partialism

Epistemic Partialism

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