Partial Privatization of State Holding Corporations

Dong, Quan; Bárcena‐Ruiz, Juan Carlos; Garzón, Marı́a Begoña

doi:10.1111/manc.12200

Cited by 29 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Matsumura (1998) pointed out that neither full privatization nor full nationalization is the optimum. Nakamura (2018) and Dong, Barcena-Ruiz, and Garzon (2018) found that the optimal degree of privatization in mixed economy varies in accordance to product differentiation. Matsumura and Kanda (2005) argued that full nationalization could be the optimal strategy under given conditions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cost‐reduction innovation under mixed economy

Nie

Yang

2020

Manage Decis Econ

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cost‐reduction innovation under mixed economy

Nie

Yang

2020

Manage Decis Econ

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“…Lee and Wang (2018) find that the timing of privatization influences the optimal degree of privatization. Dong, Barcenaruiz, and Garzon (2018) show that whether the product is a substitute or a complementary product affects the degree of privatization. Chang, Wu, and Lin (2018) find that the level of the regulated price affects the optimal privatization of a public enterprise under exogenous price control.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Duopoly, mixed ownership, and the optimal proportion of employee stocks in state‐owned enterprises in China

et al. 2019

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We examine the optimal proportion of employee stocks in two kinds of duopoly markets: The first market includes two mixed‐ownership state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), and the second market includes one mixed‐ownership SOE and one private enterprise. We introduce the particularities of employee stock ownership plans in SOEs in China to the subjective function and cost function. We find that partial holding, full holding, or non‐holding can be optimal, and the optimal proportion depends on the types of rival firms, the efficiency gap in different kinds of shares, and employee behavioral tendencies. Moreover, the optimal proportion of employee stocks is subject to external institutional environment.

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“…To explain this evidence, the literature on mixed oligopoly has analyzed the decision by governments of whether to privatize a single public firm (see, for example, De Fraja andDelbono, 1989, 1990;Corneo and Jeanne, 1994). These papers have been extended to consider, among other factors, partial privatization of public firms (Matsumura, 1998;Lin and Matsumura, 2012), privatization and mergers (Méndez-Naya, 2007, 2012, privatization of state-holding corporations (Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2017;Dong et al, 2018), and privatization with switching costs (Dong and Bárcena-Ruiz, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly

Bárcena‐Ruiz

Dong

Garzón³

2019

Estudios de Economía

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This paper analyzes the interaction between two political economy decisions by a government: whether to privatize a public firm and what environmental policy to choose (an environmental tax or an emission standard). We find that when market competition is weak the government does not privatize the public firm and sets an environmental tax. When it is intermediate the public firm is not privatized and the government sets an environmental standard. Finally, when market competition is strong the government privatizes the public firm and is indifferent between a tax and a standard.

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Partial Privatization of State Holding Corporations

Cited by 29 publications

References 38 publications

Cost‐reduction innovation under mixed economy

Cost‐reduction innovation under mixed economy

Duopoly, mixed ownership, and the optimal proportion of employee stocks in state‐owned enterprises in China

Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly

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