Partial palm vein based biometric authentication

Nayar, Gayathri R.; Thomas, Tony

doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2022.103390

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…In biometric authentication, partial authentication, excluding fingerprints, includes the iris, face, palm, and veins. In 2015, Nayar proposed a personal authentication method that combines partial palmprints and palm veins [10]. Surekha et al proposed an attendance recording system using partial face recognition and Viola-Jones algorithms in 2017 [11].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect of Smaller Fingerprint Sensors on the Security of Fingerprint Authentication

Jeong,

Jeong

2023

IEEE Access

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Small fingerprint sensors are necessary to be used in the small devices like smartphones, USBs, and cards. Different small devices have different sizes of fingerprint sensors. The scanned fingerprint image through a small fingerprint sensor is a partial fingerprint image instead of a whole fingerprint image, if we use a small fingerprint sensor. If the size of the partial fingerprints stored in the database decreases, the number of minutiae that are compared when matching decreases. Unfortunately, for the small number of minutiae, it is possible to construct "Masterprints". Masterprints can be used to impersonate multiple users stored in the database. If the size of a partial image is 15% of a whole image, a Masterprint can be produced. We investigate the vulnerability of various sizes of partial images due to the Masterprint. Because sensors have different sizes, we use partial images of 9% to 48% of a whole image. Our results show that the security of partial fingerprint authentication is severely affected by the sizes of partial images and sensors. The smaller the partial image size, the larger the impostor matching rate; and the smaller the false matching rates, the steeper the impostor matching rate increases.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect of Smaller Fingerprint Sensors on the Security of Fingerprint Authentication

Jeong,

Jeong

2023

IEEE Access

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“…The biometric authentication device providing low-quality biometric images is not appropriate and may provide high false rejections. 10 In addition to the additive/subtractive functions provided by biometric authentication devices, some biometric authentication devices may have malicious software. 11 For example, the malicious software of the scanning device may store a copy of the biometric template to replay later.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, in the application where a high‐quality biometric image is required for a better quality of authentication. The biometric authentication device providing low‐quality biometric images is not appropriate and may provide high false rejections 10 …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A protocol to establish trust on biometric authentication devices

Kiran

Moona

Biswas

2023

Security and Privacy

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One of the most extensively utilized mechanisms for person authentication is a system built using biometric‐based authentication. However, many applications use biometric authentication devices that do not support any device authentication mechanisms. As a result, a counterfeit scanning device may be substituted for the genuine one. Non‐authentic biometric authentication devices may perform some additive / subtractive or malicious functions. This paper proposes a technique for establishing trust in biometric authentication devices. The device authentication procedure is essential to build trust in biometric authentication devices such that non‐genuine biometric authentication devices are not used, which may compromise the loss of authentication factor and its replay when the genuine user is not getting authenticated. The protocol uses strong cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate the biometric authentication device with the application server and includes mechanisms for protection against the tampering of biometric templates and to prevent replay attacks. We also perform a formal verification using BAN logic to demonstrate that the proposed protocol meets the defined objectives. The proposed protocol can be used with any biometric authentication device to achieve the same objectives.

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