Partial Model Checking for the Verification and Synthesis of Secure Service Compositions

Martinelli, Fabio; Matteucci, Ilaria

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-53997-8_1

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Partial/compositional/modular model checking [1,14] has been applied extensively in the literature for security analysis [2,16,[28][29][30]. This technique relies on decomposing a system S into a set of individually analyzable subsystems S 1 S 2 .. S n for a property to be analyzed P = P 1 P 2 .. P m [5,6].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security Verification of Industrial Control Systems using Partial Model Checking

Kulik

Boudjadar

Tran-Jørgensen

2020

Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Formal Methods in Software Engineering

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Industrial control systems are moving from isolated to distributed and cloud-connected architectures. While the operational benefits of this migration form the driving force for this trend, the necessary security assurance is often difficult to achieve. Formal methods, including model checking, provide capable technologies to deal with this challenge. However, when formal verification must account for the complexity of modern control systems the state space being explored grows drastically as more details are included in the analysis. This may eventually cause a state space explosion, which makes formal verification infeasible. To address this, we propose a method for decomposing cloud-connected control systems into modules representing the different parts of the system (clients, the cloud, the control network, etc.). Based on the decomposed version of the system, we use UPPAAL to model several well-known cyber attacks and formally verify the system's behavior under these attacks. To determine viability of our approach, we first use statistical model checking SMC to assess the probabilities of success for selected attacks. Based on SMC outcomes, we use symbolic model checking to individually analyse the subsystem affected by each attack. The results obtained from this analysis are then used to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. We demonstrate our method using an actual control system architecture provided by our industrial partner. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Logic and verification; Denial-ofservice attacks; Security requirements.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Using partial model checking, Martinelli et al verify the security properties of a set of secure services [30]. Specifically, by using a synthesis orchestrator to integrate these services to form a global protocol that maintains the security properties.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%