Partial Evaluation and Non-interference for Object Calculi

Barthe, Gilles; Serpette, Bernard

doi:10.1007/10705424_4

Cited by 10 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…This language has also been implemented in the Jif compiler [44]. Barthe and Serpette [8] consider information flow in a simple object-oriented language based on the Abadi-Cardelli functional object calculi [79] and show that their type system enforces noninterference. Banerjee and Naumann [13] develop a security-type system for a Java-like imperative object-oriented language and show that it enforces noninterference.…”

Section: A Language Expressivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Language-based information-flow security

Sabelfeld

Myers

2003

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

1,546

1,221

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Abstract-Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow.Conventional security mechanisms such as access control and encryption do not directly address the enforcement of information-flow policies. Recently, a promising new approach has been developed: the use of programming-language techniques for specifying and enforcing information-flow policies. In this article we survey the past three decades of research on information-flow security, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information-flow policies. We give a structured view of recent work in the area and identify some important open challenges.

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Section: A Language Expressivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Viewing dynamic as high and static as low we obtain the connection to security. The connection with partial evaluation has been explored by Sabelfeld and Sands [17], [85], Barthe and Serpette [8], and Thiemann [100].…”

Section: Covert Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Language-based information-flow security

Sabelfeld

Myers

2003

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

1,546

1,221

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“…The bulk of previous research [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11] associates the notion of non-interference to a program and develops static analyses that accept a program only if all its executions ensure the confidentiality of secrets. In contrast, this paper presents a dynamic analysis that uses the results of a static analysis: the dynamic analysis accepts or rejects a single execution of a program without necessarily doing the same for all other executions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Automata-Based Confidentiality Monitoring

Guernic

Banerjee

Jensen

et al. 2007

Advances in Computer Science - ASIAN 2006. Secure Software and Related Issues

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Non-interference is typically used as a baseline security policy to formalize confidentiality of secret information manipulated by a program. In contrast to static checking of non-interference, this paper considers dynamic, automaton-based, monitoring of information flow for a single execution of a sequential program. The monitoring mechanism is based on a combination of dynamic and static analyses. During program execution, abstractions of program events are sent to the automaton, which uses the abstractions to track information flows and to control the execution by forbidding or editing dangerous actions. The mechanism proposed is proved to be sound, to preserve executions of well-typed programs (in the security type system of Volpano, Smith and Irvine), and to preserve some safe executions of ill-typed programs.

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“…There has been much recent progress on understanding information flow in languages of increasing complexity [SM03], and, consequently, information-flow security tools for languages such as Java, ML, and Ada have emerged [MZZ + 10], [Sim03], [Sys10]. In particular, information flow in object-oriented languages has been an area of intensive development [Mye99], [BS99], [BCG + 02], [ABF03], [BFLM05], [BN05], [ABB06], [Nau06], [BRN06], [HS09]. However, it is surprising that the impact of class initialization, being an important aspect of object-oriented programs, has received scarce attention in the context of security.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Securing Class Initialization in Java-like Languages

Rafnsson

Nakata

Sabelfeld

2013

IEEE Trans. Dependable and Secure Comput.

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Abstract-Language-based information-flow security is concerned with specifying and enforcing security policies for information flow via language constructs. Although much progress has been made on understanding information flow in object-oriented programs, little attention has been given to the impact of class initialization on information flow. This paper turns the spotlight on security implications of class initialization. We reveal the subtleties of information propagation when classes are initialized, and demonstrate how these flows can be exploited to leak information through error recovery. Our main contribution is a type-and-effect system which tracks these information flows. The type system is parameterized by an arbitrary lattice of security levels. Flows through the class hierarchy and dependencies in field initializers are tracked by typing class initializers wherever they could be executed. The contexts in which each class can be initialized is tracked to prevent insecure flows of out-of-scope contextual information through class initialization statuses and error recovery. We show that the type system enforces termination-insensitive noninterference.

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Partial Evaluation and Non-interference for Object Calculi

Cited by 10 publications

References 20 publications

Language-based information-flow security

Language-based information-flow security

Automata-Based Confidentiality Monitoring

Securing Class Initialization in Java-like Languages

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