Parsons's Early Voluntarism*

Procter, Ian

doi:10.1111/j.1475-682x.1978.tb00808.x

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 13 publications

(6 reference statements)

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“…Stage three does involve Durkheim's specific recognition of the social basis of heretofore strictly individual ends, and his realization that moral obligation, rather than rationality alone, also constitutes "subjective states of individual actors" that provide a viable basis for a theory of social order. But the notion of moral obligation has little to d o will "free will," a connection once alleged by Scott (l963), but thoroughly repudiated by Parsons (1974), Beeghley (1974a, 1974b), Gerstein (1975), andProcter (1978).D Rather than absolute "free will" in the Thomist (theological) sense, voluntarism refers to human will socially controlling human action, in contradistinction to positivistic "laws of (social) nature" to which individuals reflexively adapt.…”

Section: Stage One Pope's Version Of This Is As Followsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Durkheim and The Structure of Social Action*

Gerstein¹

1979

Sociological Inquiry

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The analysis of Durkheim in The Structure of Social Action is integral to Parsons's discussion of the utilitarian‐positivist tradition and the emergence of a voluntaristic theory of action from it. The four “stages” of theoretical argument in Durkheim can be related directly to the four defining elements of the “utilitarian dilemma,” namely empiricism, rationality, atomism, and the randomness of ends. The most questionable aspect of Parsons's argument is the alleged stubbornness of Durkheim's empiricism. On the other hand, much of the criticism of Parsons's argument, by Pope in particular, although also by Scott and Warner, Is either misdirected or itself questionable. The development and conclusions of Durkheim's moral sociology are as Parsons claims, and form a viable basis for a non‐positivist theory of action.

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Section: Stage One Pope's Version Of This Is As Followsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Durkheim and The Structure of Social Action*

Gerstein¹

1979

Sociological Inquiry

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“…4 4 Many subsequent debates about Parsons’s voluntarism have focused on questions about whether his early voluntaristic approach to action succumbed to “systems thinking” in the Social System and beyond (Habermas 1981; Levine 1998; Luhmann 1976; Procter 1978; Scott, 1971; Turner and Beeghley 1974). Relatively few note the centrality of this notion of “effort” in Parsons's conceptualization of the essential normativity of action (Camic 1989; Procter 1978, 1980; Savage 1981). These primarily offer (helpful) reconstructions of the concept in Parsons’s Structure of Social Action system rather than insight into the new dilemmas the notion created and the possible responses to those dilemmas available within and without Parsons’s thought. …”

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confidence: 99%

The Moodiness of Action

Silver

2011

Sociological Theory

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This article argues that the concept of moodiness provides significant resources for developing a more robust pragmatist theory of action. Building on current conceptualizations of agency as effort by relational sociologists, it turns to the early work of Talcott Parsons to outline the theoretical presuppositions and antinomies endemic to any such conception; William James and John Dewey provide an alternative conception of effort as a contingent rather than fundamental form of agency. The article then proposes a way forward to a nonvoluntarist theory of action by introducing the notion of moodiness, highlighting how the concept permits a richer conceptualization of actors' prereflexive involvement in and relatedness to nonneutral, demanding situations. Effort is reconceptualized as a moment in a broader process of action, where the mood is fragile and problematical. Finally, the article draws all of these elements together in an outline of a unified portrait of the pragmatist action cycle that includes both creativity and moodiness as essential moments.

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“…2To repeat, this interpretation of voluntarism will be asserted here. I have attempted to argue the case I summarize elsewhere (Procter, 1978).…”

Section: Proctermentioning

confidence: 99%