Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies

Heidar, Knut; Koole, Ruud

doi:10.4324/9780203165690

Cited by 39 publications

(26 citation statements)

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“…Another explanation may be the lack of cohesion in the party, which is a result of individual MKs fighting for their re-election. In such a competitive environment, the MKs do not consider cooperation in legislation a tool for helping them get re-elected (e.g., Bowler et al, 1999;Heidar & Koole, 2004;Hazan, 2006). We found similar behavior in Kadima, the largest party with 28 seats, which was in the opposition during the entire Knesset term.…”

Section: Strategic Alliances -How Do They Work?supporting

confidence: 52%

Legislators' Patterns of Cooperation

Akirav¹

2017

IJSSS

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This study attempts to identify the patterns of cooperation between legislators. We argue that if legislators decide to cooperate, they prefer to do so first with their colleagues who share similar affiliations and then across affiliations. In order to examine this hypothesis, we devised a unique cooperation scale and tested it using a sample of the private member bills that were initiated in the 18 th Knesset (Israel's parliament) between 2009 and 2013. We then looked at each bill with regard to its initiators and co-sponsors to see if they were members of the same party, members of the opposition or coalition, or members of a minority group. Based on the quantitative analysis, we found that of all of the factors, only being a minority was significant. Based on the qualitative analysis, we determined that intra-party cooperation does exist. In three parties -Hadash, Meretz and Israel Beitenu --legislators tended to cooperate with each other. Finally, with regard to inter-party cooperation, Jewish and Arab MKs tended to cooperate, and Russian Jewish legislators tended to cooperate regardless of party affiliation. Our study is innovative in its creation of a cooperation scale that can be used in other legislatures and that is based on measures of co-sponsorship instead of analyses of dyadic or social networks used in previous studies.

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Section: Strategic Alliances -How Do They Work?supporting

confidence: 52%

Legislators' Patterns of Cooperation

Akirav¹

2017

IJSSS

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“…Our findings show that when leaders can make use of such a tool, they are able to control, to some extent, the level of potential dissent by selecting legislators who agree more often with the party and are more loyal to it. Given the fact that parties prefer to avoid the use of party discipline when possible, or to use it in ways that are hidden from the public eye, this enriches our understanding of the sequential logic (Heidar and Koole, 2000;Olson, 2003).…”

Section: The Combined Effect Of Electoral and Selectoral Mechanisms Omentioning

confidence: 94%

Unpacking Party Unity: The Combined Effects of Electoral Systems and Candidate Selection Methods on Legislative Attitudes and Behavioural Norms

Itzkovitch-Malka

Hazan

2016

Political Studies

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This article analyses the effect of electoral systems, candidate selection methods and the interplay between them on individual legislative attitudes and behavioural norms, specifically on two facets of party unity: party agreement and party loyalty. Our main argument is that one must take into account the effect of inter-as well as intra-party competition, and the interaction between the two, in order to explain individual legislative attitudes and norms. Using data from 34 European parties across 10 countries, we show that under exclusive candidate selection methods, there are large differences between proportional representation and single-member district electoral systems in their effect on party agreement and party loyalty. Under inclusive candidate selection methods, however, such differences are much less apparent. In other words, the candidate selection method conditions the influence of the electoral system on legislative attitudes and behavioural norms.

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“…Panebianco (1988) observed that size impacts party organizational structures and bureaucratization, reflected in labor division within parliamentary party groups (Heidar and Koole, 2000). The size of the organization is important to understand the transaction costs associated with decision-making (Nooteboom, 1993 Third, we introduce a time-dynamic approach to parliamentary questions.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%