Parameters of economic reform in North Africa

Abstract

The debates over the successes and limitations of structural adjustment in North Africa swirl around how to understand the institutional framework supporting economic activity in the non‐western world. To what extent are the investment roles for state leadership and for private enterprise, especially for export, a substitute for or complementary in the contemporary development process? How far should privatisation go? For example, should natural monopolies like telecommunications or strategic sectors like phosphate and oil production be sold off?

The Political Situation, Trends and Geopolitical Implications of Sub-Saharan and North African Countries: Comparative Study

“…For these reason, the national economy of the SSA countries was gradually out of the haze of the global financial crisis. In contrast, several literature highlighted North Africa has little economic problems, however, the revolutions and insurgencies were not happened because of economic issues (Joffé, 2011;Pfeifer, 1999;Riordan et al, 1998). Not to mention, the political A. K. Addis, Z. P. Zhu Open Journal of Political Science turmoil has economic consequence, such as a dramatic escalation in food and energy cost, together with external problems, such as a global spike in oil price and some others, which add fuel to the situation (Barugahara, 2015;Joffé, 2011;Shafik, 1998).…”

Understanding the historical processes of privatization policies in North Africa: Lessons from the cases of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia

“…The repercussions were devastating. By fiscal years 1983 and 1984 investment as a percentage of GDP had fallen from 25 percent to 20 percent (Pfeifer, 1999). The response was to raise taxes, reduce government spending and curtail imports.…”

“…The response was to raise taxes, reduce government spending and curtail imports. Unemployment increased significantly while economic growth and living standards fell and state investment in the public sector did not result in the projected manufacturing jobs (Pfeifer, 1999). Morocco had to seek further IMF and World Bank support.…”

“…The state assumed a dominant role in the economy by transforming colonial acquisitions to the public sector in an interventionist policy known as "dirigisme planifié " in which the private sector was confined to small scale services (Al-Mahjub 1989, as stated in Ayubi 1995). Under Bourgeba, the state owned and controlled phosphates and hydrocarbons, finance and banking and invested in tourism, textiles and even agriculture (Saghir, 1993;Pfeifer, 1999).…”

Transitional justice for whom? Contention over human rights and justice in Tunisia

“…The unemployment rate among those with university degrees was conservatively estimated to be risen from 3.8% 1994 to 21.6% in 2008, but several sources published after the Uprising indicate that nearly half of educated youth were unemployed by the year of 2009 (Hibou et al, 2011). Faced with the lack of opportunities for decent work, which were guaranteed by the state-led development under the rule of Bourguiba (Pfeifer, 1999;Yousef, 2004), many young Tunisians began to take to the streets against the marketdriven transformation of the social and economic systems together with the rampant cronyism and corruption in the process of employment. In particular, many unemployed graduates felt that their right to work was violated as they had to have a job that was not in correspondence to their education level and, in many cases, they were 'forced to work in the informal sector' (Weipert-Fenner, 2020, p. 57).…”