Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity

Quesada, Antonio

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.008

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 9 publications

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“…Unanimous majority has been characterized by Woeginger (2003), Llamazares (2006) and Quesada (2011). 4.…”

Section: Remarkmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives

Llamazares

2013

Rev Econ Design

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Voting systems between two alternatives have been widely studied in the literature of Social Choice. One of the results given by Fishburn (The Theory of Social Choice, Princeton University Press, 1973) allows us to characterize anonymous, neutral and monotonic voting systems by means of functions satisfying adequate conditions. From among all kinds of functions, the class of affine functions is highly interesting because from them it is possible to obtain the voting systems most used in practice. In this paper we analyze the structure of the set of these functions and we show that this set is convex and its extreme points are the functions that generate the following voting systems: simple majority, absolute majority, unanimous majority and Pareto majority. Moreover, we suggest a simple method for choosing a voting system when two alternatives are under consideration.

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“…Unanimous majority has been characterized by Woeginger (2003), Llamazares (2006) and Quesada (2011). 4.…”

Section: Remarkmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives

Llamazares

2013

Rev Econ Design

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Experimental Assessment of Aggregation Principles in Argumentation-Enabled Collective Intelligence

Awad

Bonnefon

Caminada

et al. 2017

ACM Trans. Internet Technol.

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On the Web, there is always a need to aggregate opinions from the crowd (as in posts, social networks, forums, etc.). Di erent mechanisms have been implemented to capture these opinions such as Like in Facebook, Favorite in Twi er, thumbs-up/down, agging, and so on. However, in more contested domains (e.g. Wikipedia, political discussion, and climate change discussion) these mechanisms are not su cient since they only deal with each issue independently without considering the relationships between di erent claims. We can view a set of con icting arguments as a graph in which the nodes represent arguments and the arcs between these nodes represent the defeat relation. A group of people can then collectively evaluate such graphs. To do this, the group must use a rule to aggregate their individual opinions about the entire argument graph. Here, we present the rst experimental evaluation of di erent principles commonly employed by aggregation rules presented in the literature. We use randomized controlled experiments to investigate which principles people consider be er at aggregating opinions under di erent conditions. Our analysis reveals a number of factors, not captured by traditional formal models, that play an important role in determining the e cacy of aggregation. ese results help bring formal models of argumentation closer to real-world application. CCS Concepts: •Computing methodologies →Nonmonotonic, default reasoning and belief revision; Multi-agent systems; •Applied computing →Law, social and behavioral science;

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Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity

Cited by 2 publications

References 9 publications

On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives

On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives

Experimental Assessment of Aggregation Principles in Argumentation-Enabled Collective Intelligence

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