Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99

Abstract

Some prominent recent studies of civil war argue that greed, not grievance, is the primary motivating factor behind violence, basing their conclusions on a strong empirical association between primary commodity exports and civil war. This study contrasts alternative propositions that see need-, creed-, and governance-based explanations that are intimately related to the question of primary commodity dependence and conflict. Maximum likelihood analysis on approximately 138 countries over the entire postCold War period shows little support for neo-Malthusian claims. Abundant mineral wealth makes countries highly unstable, whereas scarcity of renewable resources is largely unrelated to civil conflict. A positive effect of population density on conflict does not seem to be conditioned by renewable resource scarcity. Ethnicity is related to conflict when society is moderately homogenous; a highly plural society faces less risk. Very slight political liberalization leads to conflict, but larger increases reduce the danger considerably, supporting the view that conflict is driven by opportunistic behaviour rather than by grievance. Increases in homogeneity among Islamic and Catholic populations make them riskier. Perhaps institutional factors relating to separation of church and state rather than competing creeds explain culture conflicts. Larger shares of both Christians and Muslims within countries make them safer, contrary to claims of natural antagonism between the two. Governance, proxied by the ratio of total trade to GDP, predicts peace strongly, an under-theorized area within the study of civil war. Trade's relationship to peace is robust to specification and sample size, supporting the findings of the State Failure Project. Greater attention should perhaps be paid to formal and informal institutional factors that create the synergy between private and public spaces for overcoming collective action problems of maintaining peace.

Corruption and political stability: Does the youth bulge matter?

“…We also control for the GDP per capita growth rate to take into account the opportunity costs of participation in civil disorder for the youth population (de Soysa, 2002). Brückner and Gradstein (2015) examine the effects of GDP per capita growth on political risk.…”

Oil and the ‘new wars’: another look at the resource curse using alternative data

“…Dependence on natural resources is assumed to be because of an abundance of these resources, which in turn shapes the incentives and motives of policy makers (Karl 1997;Sachs and Warner 1995). However, a measurement of dependence does not necessarily reflect abundance since a country with no industry that has even a limited quantity of resources at its disposal would still show a high ratio of primary commodities to GDP, or total exports (Fearon 2005;de Soysa 2002). Likewise, even an industrialized country with a very expensive resource, such as oil and gas, could show a dependency ratio similar to that of a very poor country exporting a cheap resource, such as agricultural produce.…”

“…While economists argue that natural resources act as a hindrance against sound economic management and economic development (Sachs and Warner 1995), political scientists and other social scientists recognize that natural wealth affects the development of institutions that generate good governance and sociopolitical progress, ceteris paribus (Auty 2001;Beblawi 1987;Chaudhry 1997;Karl 1997;Ross 2001). Leaders of resource-rich states lack incentives to build institutions around taxation and the provision of public goods, which increases vulnerability to sociopolitical failure including open rebellion (Fearon 2005;Kaldor, Karl, and Said 2007;de Soysa 2002). While several propositions about natural resources and conflict have been made, including how resources directly invite loot-seeking rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2000;Ross 2004), several recent studies raise objections about the empirical validity of previous research on theoretical and methodological grounds (Alexeev and Conrad 2009;Brunschweiler 2008;Brunschweiler and Bulte 2009;Cotet and Tsui 2013).…”

“…Resource-wealthy states are also accused of providing lower levels of public goods in terms of education and health, measured in terms of health outcomes and as health spending (Cockx and Francken 2014;Gylfason 2001;de Soysa and Gizelis 2013). Finally, resource wealth generates weak institutions (anarchic institutions) where groups organize armed violence for capturing rents, making a resource-dependent state prone to violence because either state institutions are too weak to monopolize violence or because the resources themselves invite looting, which in turn finances costly rebellion (Collier et al 2003;Fearon and Laitin 2001;Ross 2004;de Soysa 2002). Governments of resourcerich countries where income is unearned simply neglect their citizens and institutions that are needed for providing public goods (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004).…”

The soil–peace nexus: our common future

“…Webersik (2001) argued that prolonged civil conflicts in Africa are caused not by environmental scarcity but by greed or desire for control over resources. This implies that "the true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent force of greed" (Collier 2000;de Soysa 2002b). Such may be the case with the civil war in Nigeria over Biafra in the late 1960s.…”