`P, Therefore, P' Without Circularity

Sorensen, Roy

doi:10.2307/2026928

Cited by 31 publications

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“…Clark & Schaefer, 1989). Recent pragmatic theories of circularity in philosophy (e.g., Jackson, 1984;Sorensen, 1991Sorensen, , 1999 and rhetoric (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Henkemans, 1996, chapter 10) depict circularity as a defect in grounding.…”

Section: Circular Pragmaticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Circular reasoning

Rips¹

2002

Cognitive Science

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Good informal arguments offer justification for their conclusions. They go wrong if the justifications double back, rendering the arguments circular. Circularity, however, is not necessarily a single property of an argument, but may depend on (a) whether the argument repeats an earlier claim, (b) whether the repetition occurs within the same line of justification, and (c) whether the claim is properly grounded in agreed-upon information. The experiments reported here examine whether people take these factors into account in their judgments of whether arguments are circular and whether they are reasonable. The results suggest that direct judgments of circularity depend heavily on repetition and structural role of claims, but only minimally on grounding. Judgments of reasonableness take repetition and grounding into account, but are relatively insensitive to structural role.

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Section: Circular Pragmaticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Circular reasoning

Rips¹

2002

Cognitive Science

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“…I roughly distinguish two ways of assessing begging the question: (i) it is a genuine fallacy, (ii) it is not a genuine fallacy. The former includes Hoffman (1971), Sinnott-Armstrong (1999), Ritola (2001), Truncellito (2004), Walton (2006), Copi et al (2014), and the latter includes Robinson (1971Robinson ( , 1981, Sanford (1972Sanford ( , 1988, Jonathan (1988), Wilson (1988), Sorenson (1991), Lippert-Rasmussen (2001), Hazlett (2006), Woods (2008), McKeon (2016). Although I really know this distinction is too crude to be accepted, I shall not directly assess begging the question itself in this paper.…”

Section: The Main Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Both Wittgenstein and Kant Beg the Question

2018

Philosophical Investigations

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“…But given 2's intuitive credentials, this will not be easy. Here abstractionists find help from Roy Sorensen (1991), who denies a closely related principle concerning arguments.…”

Section: Two Problems For Abstractionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yet each contains the conclusion as a premise. And “no rationally persuasive argument is circular.” Therefore A–C are noncircular (Sorensen 1991: 248).…”

Section: Two Problems For Abstractionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons

Turri

2009

Nous

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Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or nonmental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 argues that reasons are mental states. Section 7 responds to objections.

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`P, Therefore, P' Without Circularity

Cited by 31 publications

References 0 publications

Circular reasoning

Circular reasoning

Both Wittgenstein and Kant Beg the Question

The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons

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