P.T.T.K. In Children

Countering Violent Nonstate Actor Financing: Revenue Sources, Financing Strategies, and Tools of Disruption

“…Research on VNSAs in Southeast Asia, for example, identify a variety of funding streams, both local and international, including criminal activity, smuggling, external support, and front companies and investments. 41 Although some local VNSAs, such as ASG, mostly fund themselves through a combination of criminal activities and local donations, groups with a more regional reach, such as Jemaah Islamiyah, have been able to enjoy both local and international sources of funding, ranging from local criminal activities and donations to international charitable and business networks. 42 Recent studies on VNSA financing in Central and West Africa have tended to focus on Boko Haram and AQ affiliated groups, which have used extortion in the Lake Chad Basin, 43 and kidnapping for ransom and illicit trafficking in West Africa.…”

“…40 As the new wave of religious terrorism garnered support around the globe, Iran and other states began to provide generous support to VNSAs. 41 It is also worth noting that, as U.S. dominance has waned with the resurgence of strategic competitors, the world order has again become increasingly multipolar, which may imply a return to the status quo ante that defined the Cold War period. Under these conditions, we should expect an increase in external state support for proxies and other VNSAs.…”

“…Similar to the figures in Chapter 2, the estimated rela- 40 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, p. 258. 41 Byman et al provide a useful table and overview of state support to insurgencies during the 1990s and early ought years. See Byman et al, 2001, pp.…”

“…40 Through its operations in Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad, AQIM was able to avoid Algeria's security forces, create smuggling streams, kidnap foreigners for ransom, set up training camps, and recruit fighters. 41 In operating transnationally, AQIM gained access to larger revenue streams and recruitment populations, along with more safe zones and training areas than it had in Algeria alone. Similar to AQIM, al-Shabaab's violent activities have largely focused on one country, Somalia, while its transnational operations support its violent efforts there.…”

“…Furthermore, the internationally recognized Government of National Accord has reportedly continued to cooperate with the United States in investigating terrorist suspects. 41 These efforts have fallen short, however, for two reasons. The first is the institutional setting in Libya.…”