2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.ibusrev.2017.02.002
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Ownership structure and earnings management in emerging markets—An institutionalized agency perspective

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Cited by 124 publications
(130 citation statements)
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References 90 publications
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“…Financial variables represent firm financial characteristics such as leverage, total assets, operating cash flow, and current profit or loss, that are likely associated with the dependent variable [26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34]. The non-financial variables include the largest shareholder, whether the firm is state-owned, frequency of board meetings, and whether the audit firm is a big four audit firm [35][36][37][38][39][40][41]. The specific definitions of the variables are shown in Table 1.…”
Section: Mode and Description Of Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Financial variables represent firm financial characteristics such as leverage, total assets, operating cash flow, and current profit or loss, that are likely associated with the dependent variable [26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34]. The non-financial variables include the largest shareholder, whether the firm is state-owned, frequency of board meetings, and whether the audit firm is a big four audit firm [35][36][37][38][39][40][41]. The specific definitions of the variables are shown in Table 1.…”
Section: Mode and Description Of Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Not surprisingly, there is increasing interest to research emerging economies. For instance, Halil and Simsek (2017) looked at the US-based emerging market mutual funds, and Bao and Lewellyn (2017) examined the ownership structure and earnings management in emerging markets. There are special issues in the journals ( for instance, Faisal Ahammad et al, 2017) and research centers in many business schools (e.g.…”
Section: Guest Editorialmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Poucos indivíduos com maior participação têm mais inventivos para se preocupar com seus interesses e, portanto, monitorar a gestão dos assuntos da empresa. Sendo assim, os gestores de empresas altamente concentradas tendem a ser altamente monitorados (Usman & Yero, 2012;Bao & Lewellyn, 2017).…”
Section: Concentração Acionáriaunclassified
“…Isso justifica ações e custos associados ao monitoramento dos acionistas controladores e dos gestores. Portanto, em comparação com outros investidores, os institucionais possuem melhores recursos para coletar informações mais confiáveis, inclusive sobre as expectativas de resultados (Kouaib & Jarboui, 2014;Bao & Lewellyn, 2017).…”
Section: Investidores Institucionaisunclassified