Ownership structure and earnings informativeness

Jung, Kooyul; Kwon, Soo Young

doi:10.1016/s0020-7063(02)00173-5

“…One line of research focuses on the empirical correlation between ownership structure and earnings quality. It includes studies, for instance, Fan and Wong (2002), Jung and Kwon (2002), Siregar and Utama (2008), Givoly et al (2009) and Xu et al (2012). Another line of research examines the relation between board characteristics and earnings equality, such as Vafeas (2000), Klein (2002), Park and Shin (2004), Osma (2008) and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of Corporate Governance in Chinese Companies on Discretionary Accruals and Real Earnings Management

Hsu

¹

,

Wen

²

2015

Asian Economic and Financial Review

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“…Jung and Kwon (2002) look at earnings informativeness instead of firm performance. They show that in chaebol firms, as opposed to non-chaebol firms, no significant relationship is found between the largest shareholder's holdings and earnings informativeness.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data

Kato

¹

,

Kim²,

Lee³

2007

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper provides the first rigorous econometric estimates on the pay-performance relations for executives of Korean firms with and without Chaebol affiliation. To do so, we have assembled for the first time panel data (that provide information not only on executive compensation and firm performance but also on Chaebol affiliation) for 246 firms that were included in KOSPI200 for at least two consecutive years from 1998 to 2001. Contrary to a popular belief that Korean corporate governance and the structure of Korean executive compensation is considerably different from elsewhere in the West, we find that cash compensation of Korean executives is statistically significantly related to stock market performance and that the magnitude of the sensitivity of pay to stock market performance is comparable to the U.S. and Japan. Perhaps even more importantly, further analysis reveals for the first time that such overall significant executive pay-performance link is driven by nonChaebol firms and that no such link exists for Chaebol firms. The evidence is consistent with the recent literature on the nature of Chaebols in Korea and the current corporate governance reform efforts in Korea that are aimed mostly at Chaebol firms. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SJEL Classification: M52, M12, G30, G15, J33, O53

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“…12 Campbell and Keys (2003) also show that firms affiliated with the top five chaebols exhibit significantly lower performance and significantly higher sales growth relative to others during the 1993-1999 period. Jung and Kwon (2002) look at earnings informativeness instead of firm performance. They show that in chaebol firms, as opposed to non-chaebol firms, no significant relationship is found between the largest shareholder's holdings and earnings informativeness.…”

Section: Corporate Governance and Chaebols In Koreamentioning

confidence: 99%

Executive Compensation, Firm Performance and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from New Panel Data

Kim

¹

,

Kato

²

,

Lee³

2005

SSRN Journal

9

0

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper provides the first rigorous econometric estimates on the pay-performance relations for executives of Korean firms with and without Chaebol affiliation. To do so, we have assembled for the first time panel data (that provide information not only on executive compensation and firm performance but also on Chaebol affiliation) for 246 firms that were included in KOSPI200 for at least two consecutive years from 1998 to 2001. Contrary to a popular belief that Korean corporate governance and the structure of Korean executive compensation is considerably different from elsewhere in the West, we find that cash compensation of Korean executives is statistically significantly related to stock market performance and that the magnitude of the sensitivity of pay to stock market performance is comparable to the U.S. and Japan. Perhaps even more importantly, further analysis reveals for the first time that such overall significant executive pay-performance link is driven by nonChaebol firms and that no such link exists for Chaebol firms. The evidence is consistent with the recent literature on the nature of Chaebols in Korea and the current corporate governance reform efforts in Korea that are aimed mostly at Chaebol firms. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SJEL Classification: M52, M12, G30, G15, J33, O53

show abstract

Ownership structure and earnings informativeness

Cited by 127 publications

References 23 publications

The Influence of Corporate Governance in Chinese Companies on Discretionary Accruals and Real Earnings Management

The Influence of Corporate Governance in Chinese Companies on Discretionary Accruals and Real Earnings Management

Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data

Executive Compensation, Firm Performance and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from New Panel Data

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