Ownership Patterns and Control of Top 100 Turkish Listed Companies

Mustafa, Aree Saeed; Ahmad, Ayoib Che; Sitraselvi, A; Chandren, P

doi:10.5296/ajfa.v9i1.10878

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Literature (Bebchuk et al, 2000;Mustafa et al, 2017) suggests that the controllers of family business groups firms can exercise control through a single class share pyramid ownership structure. In a simple pyramid ownership structure which consists of only two companies, a majority shareholder owns a controlling shares in a holding company that, in turn, owns a controlling shares in an operating company in the business groups.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pyramidal Ownership Structure and Cash Flow Wedge: Evidence From Family Business Groups of Pakistan

Hussain

2020

IJMRES

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study examines the ownership structure and cash flow wedge of ultimate controlling owners in firms affiliated with family business groups of Pakistan. The study uses unique handpicked data comprising a sample of 181 group affiliated, 112 stand-alone, 21 foreign, and 12 state owned non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange for a period of 2008-17. The study finds high degree of ownership concentration particularly in 53 family business groups. The study also finds that controlling shareholders own over 20 percent shareholdings in 60 percent of all sample firms and families own 50 percent or more shareholdings in 44 percent of group affiliated firms. The novel contribution of this study is to systematically identifying the ownership affiliation of all family business groups, developing the pyramidal ownership structure of prominent family businesses and finding the difference in voting and cash flow rights which creates significant wedge for controlling family owners. This has strong implications for regulators to ensure effective implementation of regulations as well as minority shareholders and dispersed investors for cognizant investment decision making.

show abstract

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pyramidal Ownership Structure and Cash Flow Wedge: Evidence From Family Business Groups of Pakistan

Hussain

2020

IJMRES

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Furthermore, Santiago-Castro and Brown (2007) report a significant relationship between ownership structure and minority protection. Therefore, Turkey has a series of agency problems (Mustafa & Che-Ahmad, 2017). In Turkey, the conflict of interest between shareholders is strongly exacerbated as a result of high level of wedge.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Control-Ownership Wedge and Industry Specialist Auditor

Mustafa

2021

j.auditing.finance.forensic.account.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study extends agency theory by explaining the client's understanding of audit quality. This study contributes to the audit literature by examining the effect of wedge control-ownership on industry specialist auditors that have not been researched in Turkey. The interests of minority and controlling shareholders are not completely compatible. The research analysis method used a logistic regression model, finding that firms that practice a larger difference between control rights and cash flow rights tend to prefer high audit quality measures by industry specialist auditors. This study encourages regulators to improve law enforcement to enhance the role of corporate governance in Turkey to address the features of ownership-control firms and offer a suitable environment for investment and minority shareholders.

show abstract

Board diversity, audit committee characteristics and audit quality: The moderating role of control-ownership wedge

Mustafa

Ahmad

Chandren

2018

BEH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study illustrates how control-ownership wedge impacts the monitoring role of the corporate board through the quality of audit services in Turkey. Turkey has made essential amendments in the field of external audit in order to enhance the quality of the financial report and integrate its own capital market with that of the EU. It would be of interest to examine the influence of these changes on clients' demand for high quality audit. The agency theory is integrated with the resource dependence theory to show that boards possess distinct incentives and ability to demand high quality audit to monitor management activities. Logistic regression and feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) were used for regression estimations. The results indicate that board demographics, cognitive and structural diversity of board of directors, audit committee characteristics and audit quality are complementary and control-ownership wedge weakens the relationship between them which is an unfavorable outcome for minority shareholders. Thus, this study proposes that regulators should increase law enforcement to enhance good corporate governance in Turkey to accommodate the unique features of wedge firms and provide a protected environment for minority shareholders.

show abstract

Ownership Patterns and Control of Top 100 Turkish Listed Companies

Cited by 5 publications

References 23 publications

Pyramidal Ownership Structure and Cash Flow Wedge: Evidence From Family Business Groups of Pakistan

Pyramidal Ownership Structure and Cash Flow Wedge: Evidence From Family Business Groups of Pakistan

Control-Ownership Wedge and Industry Specialist Auditor

Board diversity, audit committee characteristics and audit quality: The moderating role of control-ownership wedge

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About