Ownership, control, and pyramids in Spanish commercial banks

A influência da estrutura de propriedade e controle sobre o valor de mercado corporativo no Brasil

“…This effect emerges when the past values of the dependent variables influence the contemporary and/or future values of the independent variables (Barros, Castro Júnior, Silveira, & Bergmann, 2010). The inclusion of lags for the dependent variable in the regression model and the use of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), as performed by Gugler et al (2008) and Azofra and Santamaría (2011), is a way of mitigating this problem. Gugler et al (2008) studied the relationship between the insider ownership structure and company performance.…”

“…When the authors analyzed the companies from the United States separately, they found very different parameters between the regression models estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the GMM, which led to the following conclusions: the market value of the shares held by directors and officers captured the alignment effect, because it also positively influenced Tobin's Q and the ratio of firm's return on investment to its cost of capital; in addition, managerial shareholdings showed a negative relationship with both indicators, thus capturing the entrenchment effect. Azofra and Santamaría (2011) investigated the relationship between ownership structure and the corporate performance of 80 Spanish banks between 1996 and 2004. The results of the study's regression models, estimated by the GMM, indicated that the greater the separation between the largest shareholder's cash flow and voting rights, the smaller the company's return on assets, and when there is no divorce between ownership and control, the relationship between the controlling shareholder's shareholding and the bank's profitability is not monotonic.…”

“…National (Carvalhal-da-Silva & Leal, 2003;Silveira, Lazana, Barros, & Famá, 2004;Okimura, Silveira, & Rocha, 2007) and international (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001;Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002;Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2009;Azofra & Santamaría, 2011) empirical studies have tested the existence of a relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. These studies are generally differentiated by their approaches, and they present divergent results that lead to different interpretations.…”

Ultimate Ownership Structure and Bank Regulatory Capital Adjustment: Evidence from European Commercial Banks

“…Given the information we have, we capture the divergence between voting and cash-flow rights stemming from solely the use of indirect control chains. We do not view this as a serious shortcoming for our study as previous studies ((Claessens et al 2002), (Faccio and Lang 2002), (Azofra and Santamaria 2011)) show that the use of dual class shares is relatively scarce. 12 When the wedge is not null, 75% of the observations relate to ultimate owners that control through a divergence greater or equal to 15.75%.…”

“…We capture the extent of control dilution costs by the divergence between the voting and the cash-flow rights of ultimate owners, often named wedge. A divergence between both types of rights is known to affect the firm's performance ( (Claessens et al 2002), (Bertrand et al 2002), (Joh 2003), (Bertrand et al 2008), (Azofra and Santamaria 2011)) and the incentives of the controlling shareholder to preserve her/his voting power (Bebchuk et al 2000), possibly impacting the costs and benefits of adjusting capital structure. In our framework, we investigate whether the adjustment speed is influenced by the presence of a divergence between the voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner.…”