Overview of the Mceliece Cryptosystem and its Security

Self Cite

In this article we study the difficulty of solving Multiple Right-Hand Side (MRHS) equation systems. In the first part we show that, in general, solving MRHS systems is NP-hard. In the next part we focus on special (large) families of MRHS systems that can be solved in polynomial time with two algorithms: one based on linearisation of MRHS equations, and the second one based on decoding problems that can be solved in polynomial time.

Section: Pavol Zajacmentioning

confidence: 99%

MRHS Equation Systems that can be Solved in Polynomial Time

Zajac

2016

Self Cite

“…Its vulnerability is discussed in [6,16,26]. A detailed overview of the McEliece cryptosystem and its security can be found in [27].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Cryptographic System Based on a New Class of Binary Error-Correcting Codes

Dömösi

Hannusch

Horváth

2019

In this paper we introduce a new cryptographic system which is based on the idea of encryption due to [McEliece, R. J. A public-key cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory, DSN Progress Report. 44, 1978, 114–116]. We use the McEliece encryption system with a new linear error-correcting code, which was constructed in [Hannusch, C.—Lakatos, P.: Construction of self-dual binary 22k, 22k−1, 2k-codes, Algebra and Discrete Math. 21 (2016), no. 1, 59–68]. We show how encryption and decryption work within this cryptosystem and we give the parameters for key generation. Further, we explain why this cryptosystem is a promising post-quantum candidate.

“…Since the invention of the McEliece cryptosystem, a number of variants of the cryptosystem have been proposed with the ambition to reduce the size of the public key. An overview of the recent research on McEliece cryptosystem is presented in [9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simple Power Analysis Attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece Cryptosystem

Fabšič

Gallo

Hromada

2016

It is known that a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the McEliece cryptosystem allows an attacker to recover the secret matrix P by measuring the power consumption. We demonstrate that a similar threat is present in the QC-LDPC variant of the McEliece cryptosystem. We consider a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem. We demonstrate that this implementation leaks information about positions of ones in the secret matrix Q. We argue that this leakage allows an attacker to completely recover the matrix Q. In addition, we note that the quasi-cyclic nature of the matrix Q allows to accelerate the attack significantly.