Overview of containment venting as an accident mitigation strategy in US light water reactors

Kelly, Dana

doi:10.1016/0029-5493(91)90283-n

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…The free volume of the BWR Mark I containment is quite small relative to the other containment types. Therefore, during an accident, the containment can be overpressurized in a relatively short period of time unless steps are taken to mitigate the pressure rise [16].…”

Section: Vent System Failuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As the SBO consequence, the venting line was manually configured, through of the manual opening of vent valves, into reactor building, which required the installation of a DC power supplier and portable air compressor. It was mentioned that this manual opening is complicated due to the high radiation level that would be present following the reactor vessel failure, not allowing the access to these valves [16]. It should be noted that the venting implementation at Fukushima was interrupted sometimes by the high levels of radiation inside the reactor building [14].…”

Section: Vent System Failuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to before mentioned, we are supposing that the simultaneous opening of the parallel air-operated valves allowed the venting through two paths, via DTVS and via SGTS. The ventilation pipes and filters of SGTS were not designed to withstand large internal pressures, so these pipes would likely fail after the vent valves were opened, allowing radioactive steam, fission products and hydrogen to escape into the reactor building, with the hydrogen accumulating at the roof and likely producing an explosion [16].…”

Section: Vent System Failuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As before mentioned, under severe nuclear accident conditions, the SGTS do not have operational capability to perform gas filtering during the venting [16]. So, when the venting was performed through suppression pool (torus), the pool scrubbing was the only filtration mechanism.…”

Section: Filtered Ventingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Insights on the Safety Aspects

Thome¹,

Gomes²,

Silva

et al. 2015

WJNST

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The Fukushima nuclear accident has generated doubts and questions which need to be properly understood and addressed. This scientific attitude became necessary to allow the use of the nuclear technology for electricity generation around the world. The nuclear stakeholders are working to obtain these technical answers for the Fukushima questions. We believe that, such challenges will be, certainly, implemented in the next reactor generation, following the technological evolution. The purpose of this work is to perform a critical analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident, focusing at the common cause failures produced by tsunami, as well as an analysis of the main redundant systems. This work also assesses the mitigative procedures and the subsequent consequences of such actions, which gave results below expectations to avoid the progression of the accident, discussing the concept of sharing of structures, systems and components at multi-unit nuclear power plants, and its eventual inappropriate use in safety-related devices which can compromise the nuclear safety, as well as its consequent impact on the Fukushima accident scenario. The lessons from Fukushima must be better learned, aiming the development of new procedures and new safety systems. Thus, the nuclear technology could reach a higher evolution level in its safety requirements. This knowledge will establish a conceptual milestone in the safety system design, becoming necessary the review of the current acceptance criteria of safety-related systems.

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Section: Vent System Failuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Vent System Failuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Vent System Failuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Filtered Ventingmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Insights on the Safety Aspects

Thome¹,

Gomes²,

Silva

et al. 2015

WJNST

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In Switzerland, all nuclear power plants had installed filtered venting systems and theirs design characteristics had been described [4]. However, the negative impacts of filtered venting systems, such as containment subatmospheric pressure, hydrogen buildup in the filtered venting system due to condensation in the subcooled water pool, and unnecessary release of radioactive material due to inadvertent opening, had been studied in the US [5,7,8]. Also, estimation of the risk reduction factor of filtered venting was found to vary from 2 to 100 based on plant design and assumptions but still has large uncertainties [9][10][11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Containment Depressurization Capabilities of Filtered Venting System in 1000 MWe PWR with Large Dry Containment

Lee

Hong

Choi

et al. 2014

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

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After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, the Korean government and nuclear industries performed comprehensive safety inspections on all domestic nuclear power plants against beyond design bases events. As a result, a total of 50 recommendations were defined as safety improvement action items. One of them is installation of a containment filtered venting system (CFVS) or portable backup containment spray system. In this paper, the applicability of CFVS is examined for OPR1000, a 1000 MWe PWR with large dry containment in Korea. Thermohydraulic analysis results show that a filtered discharge flow rate of 15 [kg/s] at 0.9 [MPa] is sufficient to depressurize the containment against representative containment overpressurization scenarios. Radiological release to the environment is reduced to10-3considering the decontamination factor. Also, this cyclic venting strategy reduces noble gas release by 50% for 7 days. The probability of maintaining the containment integrity in level 2 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) initiating events is improved twofold, from 43% to 87%. So, the CFVS can further improve the containment integrity in severe accident conditions.

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Experimental study on aerosol behavior in water pool scrubbing under severe accident conditions

Deng

Zou

et al. 2020

International Journal of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Te

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Overview of containment venting as an accident mitigation strategy in US light water reactors

Cited by 6 publications

References 6 publications

The Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Insights on the Safety Aspects

The Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Insights on the Safety Aspects

Containment Depressurization Capabilities of Filtered Venting System in 1000 MWe PWR with Large Dry Containment

Experimental study on aerosol behavior in water pool scrubbing under severe accident conditions

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