Oversight as Constraint or Catalyst? Explaining Agency Influence on State Policy Decision Making

Abstract

Do agency officials hold influence over the policy decisions made by state legislators and governors? For years, scholars have asserted the important informational role that bureaucrats play within the U.S. policy-making process. However, we have only limited knowledge of the theoretical mechanisms that may allow for this influence, or ultimately, whether this influence matters to public policy outcomes. We theorize that the political oversight of the bureaucracy by elected officials not only constrains the bureaucracy but also provides a pathway for agency officials to advance their preferences by communicating their policy expertise. We assess this argument with survey data from almost 600 state agency heads, drawn from the 50 states and across all agency types. Using a multilevel model, we find that the "oversight mechanism" is a key driver of agency influence over gubernatorial policy decisions; however, it does a poor job explaining agency policy influence within state legislatures. These results suggest that oversight allows agency leaders greater success in lobbying governors than more diffuse and diverse state legislatures.

Issue expertise in policymaking

“…One is that the bureaucracy has both a defined role and advantages as a source of issue expertise. More than mere implementers of policy, the federal bureaucracy serves as the “antennae of government” – to use Workman’s (2014) depiction of the bureaucracy in monitoring issue areas and calling attention to emergent problems (also see Palus and Yackee 2013). From this perspective, bureaucrats are credible sources of expertise with well-established relationships with different congressional committees who serve as conduits of information.…”

Understanding Shared Roles in Policy and Administration: An Empirical Study of Council‐Manager Relations

“…When elected officials respect administrative competence and do not interfere with routine management operations, it is likely that managers will be more willing to cooperate with their councils in the administrative realm (Demir 2009a; Duggan 2006; Montjoy and Watson 1995; Svara 1999a). In such cases, the manager may even use council’s involvement in administration as an opportunity to increase his or her own influence in the policy process by proposing changes to policies as well as offering new ones (Palus and Yackee 2009). Our theoretical model specifies a positive association between the council’s attitudes and the city manager’s support (see figure 2).…”

“…Earlier studies focused on government structure and aimed to find out whether the presence of an elected mayor increased or decreased city managers’ role in policy making (Morgan and Watson 1992; Newell and Ammons 1987; Pressman 1972; Svara 1986, 1987; Wikstrom 1979). More recent studies, however, have explored the impact of a broader number of factors, including ideological orientations and political values (Watson 1997; Wirth and Vasu 1987); contingency and demographic factors (Jacobsen 2006; Zhang and Feiock 2010); administrative attitudes, values, and networking of managers (Mouritzen and Svara 2002); seniority of elected officials (Nalbandian 2004); legislative oversight as a mechanism of administrative influence (Palus and Yackee 2009); professional experience; administrative authority of the manager; and the nature of the council‐manager relationship (Zhang and Feiock 2010).…”

Immigration, Bureaucracies and Policy Formulation: The Case of Quebec

“…These are contingent on individual bureaucrats’ characteristics (motivations, training, ideology, experience) and on the features of political systems and bureaucratic organizations (political regime, reputation of bureaucracies, degree of delegation and types of organizations) (e.g. Carpenter, ; Nicholson‐Crotty and Miller, ; Palus and Yackee, ). Moreover, the political demands for bureaucratic input and the potential that bureaucratic policy formulation can be used to bypass political deadlocks have long been documented (Marier, ).…”