Overpressure at the Macondo Well and its impact on the Deepwater Horizon blowout

Pinkston, F. William M.; Flemings, Peter B.

doi:10.1038/s41598-019-42496-0

Cited by 18 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 24 publications

(28 reference statements)

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“…The pore pressure prediction was based on the relationship between porosity and effective stress (e.g. Hart et al., 1995; Hauser et al., 2013; Pinkston & Flemings, 2019; Zhang, 2011). The association was defined by the following equation assuming the exponential relationship (Hart et al., 1995; Rubey & Hubbert, 1959):

ϕ = ϕ_{0} e^{‐ β σ_{v}^{'}}

where ϕ is porosity, ϕ 0 is the porosity at the mudline, β is an empirical constant and

σ_{v}^{'}

is the vertical effective stress.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Overpressure evolution controlled by spatial and temporal changes in the sedimentation rate: Insights from a basin modelling study in offshore Suriname

et al. 2020

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This study investigates overpressure evolution and its relationship to the spatial and temporal changes in the sedimentation rate in the passive continental margin of offshore Suriname. We analysed well data to estimate pore pressure at the well locations and to interpret relevant overpressure-generating mechanisms. Three-dimensional basin modelling was performed to reconstruct overpressure evolution in the area. Highlights • Overpressure evolution and its relation to sedimentary history were examined in offshore Suriname. • Temporal changes in sedimentation resulted in cycles of overpressure generation and dissipation. • Spatial variation in sedimentation caused lateral changes in the amount of overpressure. • The sedimentation rate primarily controlled the overpressure evolution in the region. • The overpressure history in offshore Suriname is linked with the hinterland evolution. How to cite this article: Nifuku K, Kobayashi Y, Araki Y, Ashida T, Taniwaki T. Overpressure evolution controlled by spatial and temporal changes in the sedimentation rate: Insights from a basin modelling study in offshore Suriname.

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ϕ = ϕ_{0} e^{‐ β σ_{v}^{'}}

where ϕ is porosity, ϕ 0 is the porosity at the mudline, β is an empirical constant and

σ_{v}^{'}

is the vertical effective stress.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Overpressure evolution controlled by spatial and temporal changes in the sedimentation rate: Insights from a basin modelling study in offshore Suriname

et al. 2020

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“…The decision to not shut the well immediately, however, exposed the rig to extreme danger for over 30 min. With both the drill pipe and the wireline tools stuck, the entire bottom hole assembly had to be severed, and the well had to be side kicked, resulting in 16 million dollars worth of lost equipment alone …”

Section: Communication Challenges In Context: the Case Of The Deepwat...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With both the drill pipe and the wireline tools stuck, the entire bottom hole assembly had to be severed, and the well had to be side kicked, resulting in 16 million dollars worth of lost equipment alone. 56 The kick also had a psychological toll: it caused people to reflect on life and death scenarios and had a lasting impact on team morale. For example, it caused Jason Anderson, the junior tool-pusher on the Deepwater Horizon, to ask his employer Transocean for reassignment to another drilling rig, to discuss the possibility of a fatal accident with his father, and to start preparing a will.…”

Section: ■ Communication Challenges In Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Listening to the Well, Listening to Each Other, and Listening to the Silence─New Safety Lessons from Deepwater Horizon

Espinoza-Gala

Jetter

Alibage

2021

ACS Chem. Health Saf.

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It is common for accident reports and the analysis of large-scale disasters, such as the Deepwater Horizon blowout, to point to communication failures. This narrow explanation implicitly assumes that accidents could be prevented if employees spoke up about safety. In contrast, the first author of this paper, whose professional experience is introduced in this Commentary to provide context, has frequently observed that there are, in fact, many cases when employees speak up but are not listened to. These patterns of communication (or lack thereof) occur at the intersection of personal, leadership, and organizational factors, which jointly affect how safety issues are recognized, communicated, and addressed. As such, communication problems are at "the tip of the iceberg" of safety problems, not at their root. In this paper, we review research on high-reliability organizations (HROs) with excellent safety records to identify their communication patterns and practices and how they contribute to the ability to enact five principles of HROs: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, deference to expertise, commitment to resilience, and sensitivity to operations. We then apply this lens to investigate the Deepwater Horizon disaster, based on court documents, expert reports, and personal interviews. Specifically, we investigate how the communication patterns between the onshore experts and the offshore crews compared to the recommendations of HRO theory and how existing discrepancies might help explain the accident. We found that many employees were aware of safety issues and communicated concerns openly, but there was little organizational response to the issues they raised. This failure to listen was largely owed to factors that were not directly related to communication, such as time pressure and lack of resources, and a culture that valued a "can do attitude" and getting things done so much that it got in the way of sensitivity to operations, expert-based guidance, and communication about problems. Moreover, the challenges of the project and its aggressive timeline created an extreme, almost toxic, commitment to resilience. Based on these findings, we discuss recommendations for improving safety in offshore oil and gas production.

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“…The Deepwater Horizon (DWH) disaster that occurred on 20 April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico aroused worldwide outrage due to both its human and environmental impacts (Leifer et al, 2012). There was great interest from the public, media, politicians, and scientists, characterized by a meticulous follow-up of the progression of the oil slicks (Caruso et al, 2013;Pinkston and Flemings, 2019). Nevertheless, the future occurrence of a disaster similar to DWH would not be surprising along the African coast and, in particular, in the Gulf of Guinea, where recurrent oil spills are observed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oil slicks in the Gulf of Guinea – 10 years of Envisat Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar observations

Najoui¹,

Amoussou

Riazanoff

et al. 2022

Earth Syst. Sci. Data

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Abstract. The Gulf of Guinea is a very active area with respect to maritime traffic as well as oil and gas exploitation. Due to the failure of some actors to comply with environmental standards, this region has been subject to a large number of oil pollution episodes. This anthropogenic oil pollution is in addition to natural oil seepage from the ocean floor. This study aims to detect oil slicks in the Gulf of Guinea and to analyse their spatial distribution using synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) images. Previous works have already locally mapped oil slicks in this area; however, to our knowledge, this study is the first to achieve a global statistical analysis based on 10 years of radar images covering 17 exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the Gulf of Guinea. The present study is based on a database of 3644 SAR images collected between 2002 and 2012 by the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar (ASAR) sensor onboard the European Spatial Agency (ESA) Envisat mission, and these images allowed the identification of 18 063 oil slicks. The spatial distribution of these oil slicks is available from Zenodo: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6470470 (Najoui, 2022b). The oil slicks detected in this work encompass both oil spills of anthropogenic origin and oil seeps of natural origin (natural oil reservoir leaks). A set of 100 georeferenced oil spills is also available from Zenodo: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6907743 (Najoui, 2022a).

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Overpressure at the Macondo Well and its impact on the Deepwater Horizon blowout

Cited by 18 publications

References 24 publications

Overpressure evolution controlled by spatial and temporal changes in the sedimentation rate: Insights from a basin modelling study in offshore Suriname

Overpressure evolution controlled by spatial and temporal changes in the sedimentation rate: Insights from a basin modelling study in offshore Suriname

Listening to the Well, Listening to Each Other, and Listening to the Silence─New Safety Lessons from Deepwater Horizon

Oil slicks in the Gulf of Guinea – 10 years of Envisat Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar observations

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