It is with considerable trepidation and some real ambivalence that I find myself responding to Mike Pressley's request for a comment on Tang and Hall's (1995) meta-analysis on the literature on overjustification. In fact, I feel a bit like someone who, though known as a lover of cocker spaniels, fox terriers, and miniature collies, has somehow been asked to serve as a judge at the State pit bull and Rottweiler competition. Such a judge might have little love for these breeds; indeed, he or she might believe them to be profoundly dangerous and a downright menace to society. None the less, he or she might still feel capable of distinguishing the best from the worst of each.Let me lay my cards clearly on the table. I am not a great fan of meta-analysis as a theoretical tool. Obviously, there are a variety of purely empirical comparisons and existence claims for which the use of meta-analytic procedures to combine the results of multiple studies may be useful and important. In the medical arena, for example, one might often want to test whether seemingly consistent, but small and rarely individually significant, differences that appear in multiple studies (such as the detrimental health effects of exposure to low levels of lead contamination or second-hand smoke) represent 'real' phenomena warranting attention or intervention. I am not at all convinced, however, that these same techniques have particular value as tools for reviewing diverse theoretical literatures in which the simple 'null hypothesis' that there is no effect is patently false and the relevant question is to understand the conditions under which a particular effect is likely or not likely to occur-especially when those literatures include findings derived from a variety of different and distinct experimental procedures and measures.At the same time, within this last genre, I do find Tang and Hall's (1995) use of meta-analysis to try to test theoretical generalizations concerning the overjustification The author would like to thank Of course, one theoretically possible solution to these sorts of problems, given a very large sample of studies on a particular topic, would be to subdivide that sample on the basis of differences in procedures, measures, and the like until only relatively homogenous clusters of studies remained. In practice the problem, of course, is that there are rarely enough studies to permit this sort of differentiation and yet retain sufficient statistical power for comparing and contrasting clusters. Rather, as in Tang and Hall's (1995) analyses, such subsamples rapidly result in such small numbers of cases as to make true comparative analyses impractical.