2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2010
DOI: 10.1109/sp.2010.18
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Overcoming an Untrusted Computing Base: Detecting and Removing Malicious Hardware Automatically

Abstract: The computer systems security arms race between attackers and defenders has largely taken place in the domain of software systems, but as hardware complexity and design processes have evolved, novel and potent hardware-based security threats are now possible. This paper presents a hybrid hardware/software approach to defending against malicious hardware.We propose BlueChip, a defensive strategy that has both a design-time component and a runtime component. During the design verification phase, BlueChip invokes… Show more

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Cited by 259 publications
(213 citation statements)
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References 17 publications
(14 reference statements)
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“…Finally, our technique is complementary to other recent work on malicious trojan circuit detection (e.g., [6], [13]). We do not seek to find trojans directly, instead focusing on providing visibility in terms of high-level structures to an unstructured netlist.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 85%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Finally, our technique is complementary to other recent work on malicious trojan circuit detection (e.g., [6], [13]). We do not seek to find trojans directly, instead focusing on providing visibility in terms of high-level structures to an unstructured netlist.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 85%
“…6 In addition, it used 176 instead of 182 latches. In this case, WordRev found 50 words, 4 less than the number of words found in "TR Router".…”
Section: B Cmp Routermentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…We do not address the problem of untrusted manufacturing and IC piracy, where the designer is trusted, which can be tackled by techniques such as EPIC [19]. Our technique is complementary to other recent work on malicious trojan circuit detection (e.g., [12,21]). We do not seek to find trojans, instead focusing on detecting if a subcircuit exhibits correct behavior which is captured by a set of logical specifications; if our approach deems a sub-circuit to match an abstract component, it is guaranteed to do so due to the use of formal verification.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, wireless security imposes a technically challenging set of objectives and requirements. For example, side channel and fault induction security attacks [18] [19][24] [32][41] [45] are much more likely on cell phones and, in particular, on sensor nodes that may be deployed in unprotected or even hostile environments. Also, operational conditions and numerous design constraints such as low energy, low power, and low cost impose difficulties on security requirements.…”
Section: Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%