Over-reaction and under-reaction in climate policy: an institutional analysis

Abstract

In what circumstances do organizations react to changes in their operating environment by adopting proportionate policy responses? And drawing on institutional theory, what expectations can we formulate in relation to the proportionality of policy responses to climate change? These two research questions frame this article, which seeks to make new connections between the emerging perspective of proportionality in policymaking and existing institutional theories. We find that institutional theories are well suited to formulating expectations concerning the (dis)proportionality of policy responses, but their explanatory power can be further improved by taking the characteristics of specific climate policy problems into account. While there are many different problems nested in the 'meta' problem of climate change, we find that most of them have characteristics which suggest that policy under-reactions are more, not less likely. Amongst institutional theories, rational choice institutionalism provides the clearest expectation that proportionate policy responses are unlikely. Policy entrepreneurship is identified as one obvious way in which to stimulate proportionate policy responses, through fostering new ways of thinking within organizations. ARTICLE HISTORY

Barriers and enablers to climate change adaptation in hierarchical governance systems: the case of Vietnam

“…Consequently, some responsibilities may be either taken up by more than one agency or overlooked altogether because each agency assumes another one is responsible. In hierarchical governance systems, this tends to lead to policy paralysis where no policy actor is feeling responsible to take action (Peters et al, 2017). Moreover, the lack of dedicated institutions increases the risk of maladaptation.…”

“…After all, governments have unique constitutional tasks and responsibilities as well as vast policy instruments at their disposalmost explicitly the rule of lawthat make them indispensable for ensuring timely CCA across scales (Araos, Ford, Berrang-Ford, Biesbroek, & Moser, 2017;Jordan et al, 2015). Moreover, the state is (un)willingly creating constraining conditions that affect the capacity to adapt to climate change, such as creating conflicting tools and guidelines or under-reacting to climatic changes (Peters, Jordan, & Tosun, 2017). Paradoxically, the state is also instrumental in removing such barriers (Biesbroek, Klostermann, Termeer, & Kabat, 2013), for example to formulate vertical coordination mechanisms to create a social learning environment that allows local stakeholders to build adaptive capacity.…”

Assessing disproportionality: indexes of policy responses to the 2007–2008 banking crisis

“…The literature of policy under-overreaction revolves around conceptual typologies underlying different behavioral mechanisms and processes (Maor 2012(Maor , 2014a and general conditions, expectations and hypotheses of disproportionality Peters et al 2017). These conceptual and theoretical advances inspired a number of qualitative empirical studies (Behn et al 2015;Meyer 2016;Howlett and Kemmerling 2017;Gillard and Lock 2017).…”

Who coupled which stream(s)? Policy entrepreneurship and innovation in the energy–water nexus in Gujarat, India

“…Scholars have highlighted that policy entrepreneurs are key to bringing new proposals on the government agenda (Kingdon, 1984(Kingdon, , 1995 and causing policy change (Peters, Jordan, & Tosun, 2017), for example, by creating local policy solutions (Cummings, 2015), implementing bold policy reform (Aberbach & Christensen, 2014), and spreading policy innovation (Hoyt, 2006;Levi-Faur & Vigoda-Gadot, 2006;Mintrom, 1997;Nay, 2012). Furthermore, policy entrepreneurs have been found to influence policy making in various areas, such as economic policy (Copeland & James, 2014), transportation (Wikström, Eriksson, & Hansson, 2016), education (Verger, 2012), health (Oliver, 2006), water management (Font & Subirats, 2010), and climate action (Krause, 2011;Kwon, Jang, & Feiock, 2014) at all stages of policy development.…”