Outlines of Psychology

Wundt, Wilhelm

doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-8340-6_7

Cited by 109 publications

(172 citation statements)

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“…Affective evaluation occurs so quickly, automatically, and pervasively that it is generally thought to be an integral part of perception. Zajonc (1980) synthesized findings from a variety of fields to create a modern version of Wundt's (1907) affective primacy theory, in which he argued that feeling and thought are to some extent separate systems with separate biological bases. The affective system has primacy in every sense: it came first in phylogeny, it emerges first in ontogeny, it is triggered more quickly in real-time judgments, and it is more powerful and irrevocable when the two systems yield conflicting judgments (see also Reber, 1993).…”

Section: ) the Dual Process Problem: There Is A Ubiquitous And Undermentioning

confidence: 99%

The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Haidt

2001

Psychological Review

5,728

2,499

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Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. Four reasons are given for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post-hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it de-emphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals, emphasizing instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as anthropology and primatology.

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Section: ) the Dual Process Problem: There Is A Ubiquitous And Undermentioning

confidence: 99%

The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Haidt

2001

Psychological Review

5,728

2,499

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“…According to the first, a person voluntarily allocates attention to a stimulus. According to the second, attention is automatically drawn to a stimulus as a result of prior automatic relevance detection (see also Wundt's, 1896Wundt's, /1897, notion of active apperception). The fact that this automatic detection process calls attention is yet another element in this model that blurs the strict separation between automatic and nonautomatic processes.…”

Section: Refining the Picturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Representation or vehicle theories characterize consciousness in terms of intrinsic properties of representations or nodes, such as strength of activation, stability, and distinctiveness. For example, some models posit that representations become conscious when they receive activation above a certain threshold (e.g., R. C. Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971;Shallice, 1978;Wundt, 1896Wundt, / 1897. Process theories characterize consciousness in terms of the specific processes or computations operating over representations (e.g., Schacter, 1989).…”

Section: Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Approaches to Automaticity James (1890), Jastrow (1906), and Wundt (1896Wundt ( /1897Wundt ( , 1903 offered some of the earliest descriptions of automaticity, and many of their ideas have reemerged in contemporary accounts. The views presented below are also based on early studies of skill development (Bryan & Harter, 1899) and early dual-task studies (Solomons & Stein, 1896; see review by Shiffrin, 1988).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Automaticity: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis.

Moors

Houwer

2006

Psychological Bulletin

1,200

859

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Several theoretical views of automaticity are discussed. Most of these suggest that automaticity should be diagnosed by looking at the presence of features such as unintentional, uncontrolled/uncontrollable, goal independent, autonomous, purely stimulus driven, unconscious, efficient, and fast. Contemporary views further suggest that these features should be investigated separately. The authors examine whether features of automaticity can be disentangled on a conceptual level, because only then is the separate investigation of them worth the effort. They conclude that the conceptual analysis of features is to a large extent feasible. Not all researchers agree with this position, however. The authors show that assumptions of overlap among features are determined by the other researchers' views of automaticity and by the models they endorse for information processing in general. : automatic, unintentional, uncontrolled, autonomous, unconscious Automaticity is a concept with a long-standing history in psychology (e.g., James, 1890;Wundt, 1903). It has been invoked in domains as diverse as perception (MacLeod, 1991), memory (Jacoby, 1991), social cognition (Wegner & Bargh, 1998), learning (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002), motivation (Carver & Scheier, 2002), and emotion (Scherer, 1993). Despite its central nature, there is no consensus about what automaticity means. The aim of this article is to provide an in-depth analysis of the concept and, in particular, the features that have been subsumed under the term. We also discuss implications of this analysis for future research. KeywordsIn the first section, we consider several contrasting views of automaticity. This overview reveals that most scholars analyze automaticity in terms of one or more features. The implication is that automaticity can be diagnosed by looking for the presence of these features in performance or processes. 1 Contemporary approaches to automaticity, moreover, have begun to argue for the separate investigation of automaticity features. In the second section, we discuss the most essential features in greater detail. One purpose is to examine whether they can be separated on a conceptual level. We analyze the features to a point at which the overlap among them is minimized. Another purpose is to show that assumptions of overlap are pervasive in the research literature despite the recent claim that individual features should be investigated separately. These assumptions arise from authors' specific views of automaticity, as well as from the specific underlying information-processing model that they endorse. Approaches to AutomaticityJames (1890), Jastrow (1906), and Wundt (1896/1897, 1903 offered some of the earliest descriptions of automaticity, and many of their ideas have reemerged in contemporary accounts. The views presented below are also based on early studies of skill development (Bryan & Harter, 1899) and early dual-task studies (Solomons & Stein, 1896; see review by Shiffrin, 1988). Automaticity as Processing With No or Minimal AttentionC...

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“…There was room for still higher level systems that organized the rest. Early textbooks placed the self, the will, and similar topics at that pinnacle (Angell, 1908;James, 1892James, /1920Wundt, 1897). These interests were gradually drawn together as the study of personality (Allport, 1937;Roback, 1927;Wolff, 1947;Woodworth, 1921).…”

Section: A New Visionmentioning

confidence: 99%