Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points

Hurwicz, Leonid

doi:10.2307/2297046

Cited by 266 publications

(154 citation statements)

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“…We call this special case of Model (M P SA ) as Model (M 1 P SA ). The model (M 1 P SA ) includes in it as a special case (corresponding to R i = C i = N ) the public goods model studied in (Hurwicz 1979); thus the design of power allocation mechanism for Model (M 1 P SA ) draws inspiration from the public goods allocation mechanism presented in (Hurwicz 1979).…”

Section: Social Welfare Maximizing Power Allocation In a Single Frequmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

Kakhbod

Nayyar

Sharma

et al. 2013

Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

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Section: Social Welfare Maximizing Power Allocation In a Single Frequmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Below we present a game form (M, h) for Model (M 1 P SA ) that is inspired by the game form of (Hurwicz 1979) and is developed according to the guidelines discussed in Section 3.3. The message space:…”

Section: Social Welfare Maximizing Power Allocation In a Single Frequmentioning

confidence: 99%

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

Kakhbod

Nayyar

Sharma

et al. 2013

Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

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“…Nor is it to add to the list of abstract mechanisms which implement the Walras correspondence. Many such have already been presented (see, e.g., Hurwicz (1979), Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite (1980), Postlewaite (1985), Schmeidler (1980), Giraud and Stahn (2003) -all of which, incidentally, require at least three agents, in addition to interior CE, and bypass the case of a bilateral monopoly). We are instead inspired by the fact that the double auction has a long and rich history, not only in academia, but in real market processes (see Friedman and Rust (1993) for an excellent survey).…”

Section: Strategic Market Game: Implementing Walras Equilibria With Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)

Dubey¹,

Sondermann²

2009

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…Finally, given the assumptions on preferences 8 , and given a preference pro…le R = (R i ) i2N 2 R, an allocation x 2 F is a Walrasian allocation if there exists p 2 P , such that for each i 2 N , x i 2 B i (p) and x i R i y i , for every y i 2 B i (p).…”

Section: Economic Environmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The violation of monotonicity occurs for Walrasian allocations that are at the boundary of the feasible set 1 . Hurwicz (1979) and Schmeidler (1980) have constructed mechanisms that implement the Walrasian correspondence but in which o¤ equilibrium allocations may award negative quantities to some agents. Postlewaite-Wettstein (1989), Giraud-Rochon (2001), Dutta-SenVohra (1995) or Tian (1992Tian ( , 2000 among others, construct mechanisms that implements the (Constrained) Walrasian correspondence 2 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subgame Perfect Implementation and the Walrasian Correspondence

Bochet

2003

SSRN Journal

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Consider a class of exchange economies in which preferences are continuous, convex and strongly monotonic. It is well known that the Walrasian correspondence, de…ned over such a class of economies, is not implementable in Nash Equilibrium. Monotonicity (Maskin (1999)), a necessary condition for Nash implementation, is violated for allocations at the boundary of the feasible set. However, we know since the seminal work of Moore-Repullo (1988) and Abreu-Sen (1990) that monotonicity is no longer necessary for subgame perfect implementation. We …rst show that the Walrasian correspondence de…ned over this class of exchange economies is not implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium. Indeed, the assumption of di¤erentiability cannot be relaxed unless one imposes parametric restrictions on the environment, like assumption EE.3 in Moore-Repullo (1988).Next, assuming di¤erentiability, we construct a sequential mechanism that fully implements the Walrasian correspondence in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium.. We take care of the boundary problem that was prominent in the Nash implementation literature. Moreover, our mechanism is based on price-allocation announcements and …ts the very description of Walrasian Equilibrium.Keywords: Walrasian equilibrium, double implementation, subgame perfect equilibrium, strong subgame perfect equilibrium. This paper is partially based on chapter 2 of my Phd thesis completed at Brown University. I thank Francois Maniquet, Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra for helpful discussions and comments on this topic. I also thank William Thomson for some very helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper. contact: olivier.bochet@fundp.ac.be y University of Namur and CORE.

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Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points

Cited by 266 publications

References 1 publication

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)

Subgame Perfect Implementation and the Walrasian Correspondence

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