“Our Poverty Is a World Full of Dreams:” Reforming the World Bank

Weaver, Catherine; Leiteritz, Ralf J.

doi:10.1163/19426720-01103007

Cited by 124 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 13 publications

(1 reference statement)

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“…Analysis of organizational restructuring has taken place as well, but primarily related to perceived underperformance in a specific episode at the World Bank. In the face of widely perceived failure, the 1992 Wapenhans report found that perverted incentive structures and poor staff and loan performance monitoring led the Bank to restructure in an effort to maintain legitimacy (Weaver & Leiteritz, , pp. 373–375; Xu & Weller, , pp.…”

Section: Theories Of Io Authority and Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the Compact is seen as ineffective in altering Bank incentive structures. Safeguards remain inconsistently implemented and projects requiring them are often avoided, performance monitoring remains weak and staff thus remain focused on inputs rather than outputs, and the neoliberal economic paradigm appropriates any new staff or ideas that seek to shift Bank policy (Weaver & Leiteritz, , pp. 380–384).…”

Section: Theories Of Io Authority and Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Analyzing if and how international organizations contribute to the sustainable development goals: Combining power and behavior

Cormier

2016

J Organ Behavior

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Summary Can International Organizations (IOs) such as the World Bank, United Nations, and International Labor Organization contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)? This article argues that this is best analyzed by simultaneously considering two sets of factors: the international political constraints external to IOs and the organizational processes and structures internal to IOs. More specifically, this article suggests that such analyses can take place by combining scholarship on International Relations (IR) and Organizational Behavior (OB). The article defines international power, outlines various constraints on IO autonomy, and suggests that OB and IR are well positioned to jointly improve the study of IO employment practices, organizational structures, bureaucratic politics, and inter‐organizational effects. The core aim is to provide justification and material for combining IR and OB in further research on IOs.

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Section: Theories Of Io Authority and Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theories Of Io Authority and Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing if and how international organizations contribute to the sustainable development goals: Combining power and behavior

Cormier

2016

J Organ Behavior

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“…While there were numerous undercurrents detectable throughout the workshop, it was apparent that the event was a negotiated performance rather than a broad‐based forum for open and well‐informed discussion as the World Bank claimed 9 . It was an act required by the Bank because their international legitimacy depends on such public displays of transparency, engagement and consultation (Wade, 2002; Weaver and Leiteritz, 2005). I call it a performance because it is based not on the presence of these norms but the appearance of supporting them (Guttal and Shoemaker, 2004).…”

Section: The Ideal Of Participation In Nt2mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This highlights the importance of national institutions as well as the contingency of the Bank's development practices. For instance, Nielson and Tierney (2003: 265) argue that ‘Despite conventional wisdom that portrays borrowing countries as helpless in the face of a unified “Northern Bloc”, developing countries often — if not always — have significant leverage over the architecture of the final loan document’ (see also Gutner, 2005; Weaver and Leiteritz, 2005). Project‐specific accounts indicate that the World Bank has little effective control over the localized process of turning policy into implementation (Bebbington et al, 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

World Bank‐directed Development? Negotiating Participation in the Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project in Laos

Singh¹

2009

Development and Change

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The omnipotence of the World Bank on a global scale means that it is often regarded as the most influential partner in bringing about transformations in developing countries. This article contributes to ongoing discussions of this issue by examining some effects of the Bank's participatory agenda in one of its flagship projects, the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) hydropower scheme in Laos. Critical accounts suggest that the Bank's promotion of participation in donor‐dependent countries like Laos is either a guise or an imposition. These propositions are considered in two settings where participation was debated around the time of the Bank's loan appraisal for NT2: first, an international stakeholders’ workshop held in Vientiane; and second, some international attempts to identify the concerns of villagers living near the NT2 dam site. In workshops and villages, participation is a negotiated performance whereby competing representations emerge through the interaction between village, state and international actors. More generally, this article shows that a grounded view of development can attend to the practices that constrain the hegemonic tendencies of the World Bank, even while maintaining awareness of the potency of its policies and interventions.

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“… Key references on governance reforms in the Bretton Woods organizations include Birdsall (), Buira (), Einhorn (), Kapur (), Leech and Leech (), Lesage et al. (), Phillips (), Stiglitz (), Weaver and Leiteritz (), Woods (, ), and Woodward (). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Still in the Woods: Gridlock in the IMF and the World Bank Puts Multilateralism at Risk

Vestergaard

Wade

2014

Global Policy

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The Western hegemony of the past 200 years is ending as power shifts towards the East and as Western states lose the authority to uphold a rules-based multilateral order. In the wake of the Great Crash of 2008 the G20 leaders took steps to bolster the multilateral order, including reform of the governance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank so as to reflect the increasing economic weight of developing countries. The executive boards of both organizations affirmed that the primary criterion for allocating voting shares should be shares of world GDP. We show that the reforms at the IMF and the World Bank have substantially failed to meet their ostensible objectives. First, in both organizations the developed countries gained voting share relative to GDP share between 2009 and 2014. Second, countries continue to vary widely in their share of votes relative to share of world GDP; in both organizations some countries have six times or more the votes relative to GDP of others. Politicians and analysts should give attention to achieving more equitable governance in these important multilateral organizations. At the end of this article we show how this could be done. Policy Implications• To strengthen the multilateral order the Bretton Woods organizations should make a more determined effort than hitherto to adapt their governance structures to changes in the relative economic importance of countries.

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“Our Poverty Is a World Full of Dreams:” Reforming the World Bank

Cited by 124 publications

References 13 publications

Analyzing if and how international organizations contribute to the sustainable development goals: Combining power and behavior

Analyzing if and how international organizations contribute to the sustainable development goals: Combining power and behavior

World Bank‐directed Development? Negotiating Participation in the Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project in Laos

Still in the Woods: Gridlock in the IMF and the World Bank Puts Multilateralism at Risk

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