Our inalienable ability to sin: Peter Olivi’s rejection of asymmetrical freedom

Kent, Bonnie

doi:10.1080/09608788.2017.1334187

Cited by 23 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The first is as follows: in De casu diaboli the teacher fails to mention the terms ‘free will’, ‘freedom’ ‘free choice’ or any cognate terms in the entire text; and, indeed, it is not until chapter 21, by which point Anselm has hitherto provided the core of his argument, that the student mentions ‘free will’, and this phrase is still only used twice by the student where both appear in the same paragraph 11 . Now, this point is crucial, since Anselm, as Kent (9, 1085) notes, is remarkably fastidious in the exposition of his arguments and in the terms which he employs to present those arguments. It is therefore highly improbable, I argue, that Anselm’s De casu diaboli is in the business of providing an ‘extension’, or even a recapping, of AF 12 .…”

Section: Freedom Praise and Blamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Here is the structure of the paper: In section 2, I present AF; and in section 3, I provide two arguments for why many philosophers are mistaken in thinking that De casu diaboli pertains to freedom. Firstly, (building upon Kent (9)) I argue that since De casu diaboli significantly lacks free‐will terminology, it is therefore highly probable that it does not extend AF, and secondly I argue that in construing the text as relevant to freedom, many philosophers confuse AF by eliding Anselm’s conditions for praise and blame with his conditions for freedom, and thereby develop overly‐complex theories of AF. I conclude: separating Anselm’s account of praise and blame (hereafter: APB) from AF is theoretically more economical and helps us to better understand AF and De casu diaboli .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“… Now, Kent (9, 1085) similarly notes – albeit fleetingly – the lack of free will‐terminology in De casu diaboli and similarly thinks this suggests that De casu diaboli does not pertain to freedom. Here I am following Kent’s lead, and am very much in agreement.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… There are, however, dissidents: Kent (9), Williams (17) and Ekenberg (3) all reject the notion that De casu diaboli principally pertains to freedom. And, Tyvoll (14) develops a hierarchical account of freedom, similar to Frankfurt’s (4), that concerns Anselm’s theory of ultimate responsibility , which recognises that ultimate responsibility might not always require the ability to sin (e.g.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Anselm’s Account of Freedom and De Casu Diaboli

Collier

2019

The Heythrop Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Freedom Praise and Blamementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Anselm’s Account of Freedom and De Casu Diaboli

Collier

2019

The Heythrop Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy

Hoffmann

2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this book Tobias Hoffmann studies the medieval free will debate during its liveliest period, from the 1220s to the 1320s, and clarifies its background in Aristotle, Augustine, and earlier medieval thinkers. Among the wide range of authors he examines are not only well-known thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham, but also a number of authors who were just as important in their time and deserve to be rediscovered today. To shed further light on their theories of free will, Hoffmann also explores their competing philosophical explanations of the fall of the angels, that is, the hypothesis of an evil choice made by rational beings under optimal psychological conditions. As he shows, this test case imposed limits on tracing free choices to cognition. His book provides a comprehensive account of a debate that was central to medieval philosophy and continues to occupy philosophers today.

show abstract

The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Ethics

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

By the end of the Hellenistic period, pursuit of the good life had established itself as the main purpose of philosophy. Academic skeptics argued that each dogmatic school's thought hangs off its view of the human final end and then proceeded to attack all possible systems. 1 Stoics positioned ethics as the crowning gem of their curriculum. Epicureans went so far as to judge theories in physics by whether one could attain tranquility by accepting them.Augustine and Boethius are squarely rooted in this Hellenistic outlook, which makes living well the linchpin of all philosophical undertaking. Just as important was the idea that the best life for a human (Greek: eudaimonia; Latin: beata vita) is a matter of realizing our distinctively human nature. Within the domain of ethics, ideas about living well are ideas about human excellence or virtue (Gr.: arete; Lat.: virtus). These, in turn, are grounded in ideas of human nature within the domains of physics and psychology.While the various Hellenistic schools argued about the details, for the most part they all took this general framework for granted.When Augustine and Boethius depart from this Hellenistic rootstock, it is by grafting on Christian and Platonist ideas, which are sometimes hard to distinguish from each other. The result is a hybrid of sorts, a living system which is what the West later came to accept as Platonism. At the heart of this system is the notion that human beings are metaphysical straddlers: we have one foot in eternity and another in time. When it comes to the good life, the task is to live the best life for us, given the kind of thing we are. In practical terms, this calls us to reorient our lives around eternal norms, even amid the transient concerns of everyday life.The present chapter aims to orient readers to the early medieval

show abstract

Our inalienable ability to sin: Peter Olivi’s rejection of asymmetrical freedom

Cited by 23 publications

References 23 publications

Anselm’s Account of Freedom and De Casu Diaboli

Anselm’s Account of Freedom and De Casu Diaboli

Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy

The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Ethics

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About