Ought to Believe

Chrisman, Matthew

doi:10.5840/jphil2008105736

Cited by 67 publications

(33 citation statements)

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“…I should note that neither Weatherson nor Steup endorse (P1).10 The same basic argument is present inChrisman (2008).…”

mentioning

confidence: 60%

“…So too does Ryan (2003, p. 49), who then goes on to argue that various versions of the 'ought implies can' principle are false. Chrisman (2008) seems to accept the move when the 'ought' is an 'ought-to-do'; he tries to rescue doxastic oughts by construing them as something other than oughts-to-do. 51 The Chuard and Southwood paper, which covers this ground in much more detail, came to my attention after I had already drafted this material.…”

Section: The 'Ought Implies Can' Argument For (P1)mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Chrisman (2008) focuses on ought. Weatherson (2008) discusses not only these notions but also praise-and blameworthiness.…”

Section: The Anti-deontology Argumentmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

McHugh

2011

Erkenn

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We tend to prescribe and appraise doxastic states in terms that are broadly deontic. According to a simple argument, such prescriptions and appraisals are improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are voluntary. One strategy for resisting this argument, recently endorsed by a number of philosophers, is to claim that our doxastic states are in fact voluntary (This strategy has been pursued by Steup 2008; Weatherson 2008). In this paper I argue that this strategy is neither successful nor necessary. Our doxastic states are not voluntary in any interesting sense. But once we see why our doxastic states are not voluntary, we can also see that there is no apparent reason to think that deontic prescriptions and appraisals-epistemic ones, at any rate-presuppose doxastic voluntarism. Indeed, there is good reason to deny that they do so. Finally, I diagnose the misleading attraction of the idea that what I call 'epistemic deontology' presupposes doxastic voluntarism.

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“…I should note that neither Weatherson nor Steup endorse (P1).10 The same basic argument is present inChrisman (2008).…”

mentioning

confidence: 60%

Section: The 'Ought Implies Can' Argument For (P1)mentioning

confidence: 95%

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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

McHugh

2011

Erkenn

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“…In the tradition of doxastic non voluntarism (e.g. Chrisman 2008;Strawson 2003;Williams 1973), Hieronymi holds that such acts cannot be voluntary acts, because one of the essential characteristics of voluntary acts is that it is up to the agent to decide whether or not to perform them, but it is not up to the agent to randomly decide what to judge or what to intend.…”

Section: Choice As Managerial Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Choice in a two systems world: picking & weighing or managing & metacognition

Vierkant

2017

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Intuitively, choices seem to be intentional actions but it is difficult to see how they could be. If our choices are all about weighing up reasons then there seems no room for an additional intentional act of choice. Richard Holton has suggested a solution to this puzzle, which involves thinking of choices in a two systems of cognition framework. Holton's suggestion does solve the puzzle, but has some unsatisfactory consequences. This paper wants to take over the important insights from Holton on the phenomenology of choice and the possible explanation via a two systems framework, but wants to suggest an alternative more satisfactory account. This account is built around the idea that choices are what Pamela Hieronymi calls managerial acts. After developing the claim the paper then defends it against the objection that managerial control cannot be understood in a system1 context, by examining recent research on uncertainty monitoring and early forms of metacognition.

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“…Since hidden states are given by the programmer, the robot cannot cope with unexpected hidden states. Maybe, they need some methods of hidden state detection such as [4,9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavior coordination for a mobile robot using modular reinforcement learning

Uchibe

Asada²,

Hosoda³

Proceedings of IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems. IROS '96

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Coordination of multiple behaviors independently obtained by a reinforcement learning method is oneof the issues in order for the method to be scaled to larger and more complex robot learning tasks. Direct combination of all the state spaces for individual modules subtasks) needs enormous learning time, and it causes x idden states. This paper presents a method of modular learning which coordinates multiple behaviors taking account of a trade-off between learning time and performance. First, in order to reduce the learning time the whole state space is classified into two categories based o n the action values separately obtained by Q learning: the area where one of the learned behaviors is directly applicable (no more learning area , competition of multiple behaviors re-learning area). the learned action values based on the information criterion. Finally, the initial action values in the relearning area are adjusted so that they can be consistent with the values in the no more learning area. The method is applied to one to one soccer playing robots. Computer simulation and real robot experiments are given to show the validity of the proposed method. and the area where learning is necessary due to t A e Second, hidden states are detected b y model fitting to

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Ought to Believe

Cited by 67 publications

References 0 publications

Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

Choice in a two systems world: picking & weighing or managing & metacognition

Behavior coordination for a mobile robot using modular reinforcement learning

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